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RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLES FIVE AND SIX
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AS A BAROMETER OF LEGAL REFORM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA
Jeffrey Kahn*
This Note examines two of Russia's obligations under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR): the Article 5 right to liberty and security, and the Ar-
ticle 6 right to a fair trial to gauge Russian compliance with European human
rights norms. These articles lie at the heart of systematic legal reform in the Rus-
sian Federation. This Note defends the thesis that the agonizingly slow progress of
judicial reform and the advancement of human rights in Russia is a function of
the inevitable lag of conceptual norms behind institutional reform. Part I explores
the weak place of the rule of law as an institutional force in Soviet and post-Soviet
Russian history and emphasizes the power of conceptual legacies as well as the
path dependency of prior institutional choices. Part II presents the current legal
architecture of the Russian Federation as it relates to the ECHR, discussing first
the position of international treaties in Russia ' hierarchy of laws and, second,
domestic Russian criminal law and criminal procedural law. Part IlI focuses on
the conceptual and legal distance that separates Russian domestic law from the
human rights obligations that Russia has undertaken in international treaties
with the Council of Europe. Part IX analyzes the steadily growing docket of com-
plaints lodged against Russia for alleged violations of the ECHR. Finally, Part V
advocates a variety of educational reforms at every level of Russian society by both
foreign and domestic actors. The Note concludes on a note of alarm, predicting the
weakening of institutional legal structures absent conceptual and attitudinal
changes.
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(ECHR) on February 28, 1996.1 Upon its ratification, on May 5,
1998, Russia became a full member of the Council of Europe. As a
high-contracting party, Russia accepted the obligation "[to] secure
to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" de-
scribed in the ECHR . Russia recognized the authority of the
European Court of Human Rights to ensure observance of this ob-
ligation,4 and the right of individuals to petition the Court alleging
violations of the ECHR by the Russian state, a right extraordinaryS 5
in international human rights law.
Accession to the ECHR has been hailed as a sign of great pro-
gress for Russia's human rights record and for its development as a
rule of law state.6 Nevertheless, virtually all respected international
observers have seriously criticized Russia's weak legal institutions
1. See Council of Europe Treaty Office, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipaLhtm (last visited April 9, 2002) [hereinafter
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications]. The Convention was opened for signature in Rome
on November 4, 1950, and entered into force following ratification by ten signatories on
September 3, 1953. As of March 4, 2002, accession has been made by forty-one states. Id.
2. The Russian Federation signed the Convention in Strasbourg on February 28,
1996. The Russian Duma, the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly, voted in favor of rati-
fication on February 20, 1998. The Federation Council, the upper chamber, voted in favor
on March 13, 1998. President Boris Yel'tsin signed the federal law ratifying the treaty on
March 30, 1998. See 0 ratifikatsii Konventsii o zashchite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod i
Protokolov k nei, No. 54-FZ, [On Ratification of the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Protocols to it, Federal Law 54-FZ,] Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, [Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation], 1998, No. 14, Art. No. 1514,
at 2939-40. Russian ratification was made with reservations, which are discussed infra Part
II.B. and accompanying text.
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Europ. T.S. No. 5, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/TreatiesI
Html/005.htm [hereinafter ECHR].
4. ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 19.
5. ECHR, supra note 3, at Protocol No. 11. This amendment to the ECHR "created,
for the first time in the history of international law, a right for individual human beings to
make states accountable before an international court for alleged breaches of their interna-
tional obligations." L.J. CLEMENTS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER
THE CONVENTION 13 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 1999) (1994). The rights and duties of indi-
viduals in contradistinction to, and even against, states is not unheard of in public
international law. Nevertheless, "[ffor the most part, however, the individual remains an
object, not a subject, of international law... ." D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw 142 n.2 (Sweet & Maxwell 5th ed. 1998) (1973).
6. See, e.g., Marjorie Farquharson, End Note: Kalashnikov Versus the Russian Federation, 5
RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Dec. 12, 2001, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/search/ ("In the not
too distant future, decisions taken in a quiet Rhineland courtroom could supply much-
needed voltage to the meandering process of legal reform in the Russian Federation, as they
have already done in other parts of Europe."); see also Bill Bowring, Russia's Accession to the
Council of Europe and Human Rights: Four Years On, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 362, 363 (2000)
("[T]here are perhaps even more convincing grounds for concluding that Russia is under-
going genuine and profound transformation as a direct result of accession, especially in the
application of the rule of law.").
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and poor human rights record.7 Russian membership in the Coun-
cil of Europe and compliance with the strictures of the ECHR has
been far from easy; criticisms of Russia's human rights record, the
generally poor condition of state institutions, and the weak state of
the rule of law repeatedly have been made by rapporteurs to the
Council." Anxiety over continuing large-scale violence in Chechnya
is another massive stumbling block to acceptance of Russia as a co-
equal by other member-states.9 On April 6, 2000, the excesses of
the Second Chechen War resulted in suspension of Russia's voting
rights in the Council's Parliamentary Assembly, a sensational walk-
out from that body by the Russian delegation, and vituperative dip-
lomatic exchanges on both sides.'l International observers were,
7. Freedom House World Rankings, available for Russia for every year since 1991, are
widely respected as authoritative and methodologically rigorous. Countries are ranked on a
seven-point scale-one being the highest and seven being the lowest level of democratic
progress-in two categories: political rights and civil liberties. Russia's Freedom House rank-
ing for 1999-2000 in those categories was four and five, respectively. At no point in the last
ten years has Russia earned lower than a three in either category. Russia's most recent com-
posite ranking (4.25) puts it below Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia in terms of
democratic measures. See NATIONS IN TRANSITION, 1999-2000: CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY
AND MARKETS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 530 (Adrian
Karatnycky et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter KARATNYCKY ET AL.]; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HUM. RTS. WATCH WORLD REp. 2000 286-93 (Dec. 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HUM. RTS. WATCH WORLD REP. 2001 313-20 (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter HUM. RTs. WATCH
WORLD REp. 2001].
8. See Rudolf Bernhardt et al., Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian
Federation with Council of Europe Standards, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 249,250-95 (1994).
9. See Sergei Kovalev, Putin's War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 10, 2000, at 4-8.
10. For an excellent summary of the Parliamentary Assembly's actions in April, see
Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Opinion of the Committee on Legal Af-
fairs and Human Rights Doc. No. 8956 (Jan. 25, 2001), available at
www.stars.coe.fr/doc/doc0l/edoc8956.htm (June 19, 2001). For unofficial transcripts and
summaries of the debates (including very frank comments by Vladimir Zhirinovsky), see
Provisional Version of the Report of the Debate of 06 April 2000 at 10 A.M., available at
http://stars.coe.fr/verbatim/20002/e/0002061000e.htm (April 7, 2000) and Provisional
Version of the Report of the Debate of 06 April 2000 at 15 PM. [sic] available at
http://stars.coe.fr/verbatim/20002/e/0002061500e.htm (April 7, 2000). LordJudd, in the
presentation in the morning session of April 6, 2001 on his report on the conflict in Chech-
nya and the credentials of the Russian delegation, expressed his dismay that the European
Court of Human Rights had been sidelined:
I find it unbelievable that our governments have not so far found a way of referring
some of the allegations and issues to the court. That is feebleness at the beginning of
the twenty-first century. What on earth is the point of having these institutions if our
governments are not prepared to act? ... I conclude by saying to my Russian friends
that the Council of Europe is about human rights or it is about nothing.
Provisional Version of the Report of the Debate of 06 April 2000 at 10 A.M., available at
http://stars.coe.fr/verbatim/20002/e/0002061000e.hun (April 7, 2000); see also HUM. RTs.
WATCH WORLD REP. 2001, supra note 7, at 319.
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and are, split on "the Russian question": would Russia's democratic
and legal institutions be strengthened by continued membership
in the Council, or would ongoing violation of the ECHR do no
more than bring the efficacy of this innovative human rights system
into doubt, in the process diminishing the reputation of the Coun-
cil of Europe as a whole?"
This question is as relevant (and unanswered) today as it was
when Russia signed the ECHR in 1998. This Note examines two of
Russia's obligations under the ECHR: the Article 5 right to liberty
and security, and the Article 6 right to a fair trial. 12 There are a
number of reasons to consider these articles as good barometers of
the state of Russian compliance with European human rights
norms. First, Russian human rights lawyers themselves identify
these two articles as foremost in importance to them; representa-
tives from one of the leading human rights centers in Moscow
noted that Articles 5 and 6 account for most of their cases. 13 Sec-
ond, the rights expressed in these articles lie at the root of systemic
legal reform in the Russian Federation. These rights address such
issues as arrest and detention, the independence and power ofju-
dicial bodies, the conduct of trials, and fundamental concepts like
the presumption of innocence and the right to a defense. Third, as
is clear from even this abbreviated laundry list of issues, the dura-
bility of these rights affects the protection in Russian courts of
many of the other rights enumerated in the ECHR as well as those
found in the Russian Constitution, or, in fact, of any matter that
requires the existence of a fair, impartial, and reliable judicial sys-
tem.
The political elite of the Russian Federation was consigned by
history to rebuild a complex federal state in the conceptual, insti-
tutional, and physical rubble of two anciens regimes: the Soviet
Union and the Russian Empire. Neither of these great powers were
11. At one extreme of this debate, some respected lawyers who practice before the
Court predict the demise of the ECHR process as it has operated for the last fifty years. See
Interviews with international and Russian human rights lawyers in London, UK, and Mos-
cow, Russ. (Summer 2001) (cited on condition of anonymity) (on file with author). They
predict a heightening of admissibility requirements. The imposition of these difficult proce-
dural hurdles prior to any hearing of a case on its merits would ease the bottleneck of
Russian cases that could choke the already slow docket of the Court. Id. They also predict
that as particularly egregious violations of the ECHR are increasingly exposed in successful
complaints against Russia, the complaints of Western European litigants will appear com-
paratively less serious, resulting in less attention to them by the Court. Id.
12. These articles are reproduced in full, infra in Appendix A.1.
13. Interviews with participants in the 2000 and 2001 Council of Europe Summer
Schools, Moscow, Russ. (Summer 2000 and 2001) (cited on condition of anonymity) (on file
with author). Indeed, more than half of all complaints to Strasbourg revolve around Article
5 and Article 6 issues. See CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 139.
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noted for devotion to the rule of law in general or to human rights
in particular. This Note defends the thesis that the agonizingly slow
progress of judicial reform and the advancement of human rights
in Russia is a function of the inevitable lag of conceptual norms
behind institutional reform. The injection of modern, Western
European human rights norms, therefore, cannot "fix" Russia
overnight. To reconcile the discrepancies that exist between Rus-
sian and ECHR legal standards will require much more than the
stroke of a legislating pen. Part I explores the weak place of the
rule of law as an institutional force in Soviet and post-Soviet Rus-
sian history and emphasizes the power of conceptual legacies as
well as the path dependency of prior institutional choices. Part II
presents the current legal and political architecture of the Russian
Federation as it relates to the ECHR, discussing first the position of
international treaties in Russia's hierarchy of laws and, second,
domestic Russian criminal law and criminal procedural law. Part III
focuses on the conceptual and legal distance that separates Russian
domestic law from the human rights obligations that Russia has
undertaken in international treaties with the Council of Europe.
Part IV analyzes the steadily growing docket of complaints lodged
against Russia for alleged violations of the ECHR. Finally, Part V
advocates a variety of educational reforms at every level of Russian
society by both foreign and domestic actors. The Note concludes
on a note of alarm, predicting the weakening of institutional legal
structures absent conceptual and attitudinal changes.
I. THE RULE OF LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The manner of thinking about law and legal abstractions-by
politicians, judges, lawyers, and even the population in general-is
as important as any constitutional commitment to the rule of law
itself. Perhaps the most important issue with which to begin analy-
sis of Russia's compliance with the ECHR is the level of
development of Russian conceptions of the rule of law itself. 4 It is
impossible to overstate how difficult and slow such a transition in
thinking will be in post-Soviet Russia. The agonizingly slow and of-
ten brutally harsh experience of economic transition (a transition
14. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 7, § 2 (judging criminality "according to the
general principles of law recognized by civilised nations[,]" i.e., not just by national law
definitions of crimes); ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 13 (establishing as a positive obligation
the existence of an "effective remedy" to the violation of Convention rights and freedoms).
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that focused on the essentials of a market economy of goods and
services that people need simply to go about their daily lives)
should suggest how much more problematic such an intangible
conceptual transition must be. 5 To borrow a phrase from Jon El-
ster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss, the problem is much more
complicated than "rebuilding the ship at sea"-the Russian ship of
state has never even had a maiden voyage propelled by the rule of
law. 16
When legal scholars and political scientists compare modern
democracies, government under law is generally considered to be a
fundamental precondition.17 Legal scholars with knowledge of both
the ECHR and Russia point to a developing appreciation for the
rule of law in Russia as a fundamental achievement of Russia's ac-
cession to the Convention.' 8 That said, it should be stated at the
outset that, by any responsible measurement, the rule of law in
Russia is still far from consolidated.' 9
The preposition in the phrase "government under law" is the op-
erative word, defining a relationship between citizen and ruler that
preceded the development of modern democracies by hundreds of
years. Democracy may put the power to choose and be chosen a
lawmaker in the hands of the citizen, but it is a political power ca-
pable of only periodic exercise. Without the legal power to use the
authority of courts to compel action, disclose information, and
demand the rational use of the power of the state, the force of de-
mocracy to ensure individual rights is greatly diminished. Law is
15. See, e.g., Archie Brown, Introduction in CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLITICS: A
READER 247-51 (Archie Brown ed., 2001).
16. JON ELSTER ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES: RE-
BUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA (1998).
17. See, e.g., JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE
3, passim (1996). For analysis particular to the ongoing transition from post-totalitarian au-
thoritarianism in post-Soviet Russia, see JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION,
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA (forthcoming 2002).
18. See Bowring, supra note 6, at 363 ("[T]here are perhaps even more convincing
grounds for concluding that Russia is undergoing genuine and profound transformation as
a direct result of accession, especially in the application of the rule of law.").
19. Russia scores a 5.25 on the 1999-2000 Freedom House seven-point scale for devel-
opment of the rule of law (where one indicates the most progress, seven indicates the least
progress). This is a composite score based on measures of the constitutional, legislative, and
judicial framework (4.25/7), and corruption (6.25/7). By comparison, neighboring Poland
scored a 1.88, Lithuania a 2.88, and Tajikistan a 5.88. See KARATNYCKY ET AL., supra note 7, at
25, 42,541-46.
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what makes democratic government a "republic of reasons" and
not simply, ruthlessly, majoritarian rule.
The English language, unfortunately, does not lend itself to the
distinctly different meanings telescoped into the word "law." Of
course, law can be understood in positivist terms as simply the stat-
utes, legislation, and rules enacted by legislatures. But law, or
rather "Law," may also connote first principles for the organization
of human relations (in the American and English legal traditions,
primarily developed through the common law). The state, as Har-
old Berman neatly phrased it, is "not only a creator but also a
creature of law.",2' The difference between a state governed by laws
and one ruled by Law is enormous. The former, what Berman
called a "law-based state," is the Rechtsstaat. laws, that is, statutes
and other legislation are the supreme authority in the state by vir-
tue of the process of lawmaking that generates them. It is the state,
to paraphrase Max Weber, that exercises monopoly control over
the creation of law. A "Rule of Law" state, on the other hand, is a
state that is not the sole source of law. In common law countries,
courts (administered by the state but deliberately located at a dis-
tance from the overtly political branches of state power) are the
wellspring of principles of equity and other normative standards.
In both common law and civil law countries, theories of natural
law, the counterweight of civil society, and customary private law
have served as sources of Law beyond the generative power of a
state's parliament. The laws of the legislature may be declared
unlawful or, rather, un-Lawful, because mere procedural accuracy
is not enough to legitimate (consecrate) the law. "While, in com-
plying with the notion of the rule of law, the political power that
governs the state is subordinated to a law that it has not directly
produced, in the case of Rechtsstaat, the state subordinates itself to
20. CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20 (1993) ("The minimal condition
of deliberative democracy is a requirement of reasons for governmental action ... a repub-
lic of reasons.").
21. Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat), in TOWARD
THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA? POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD
49 (Donald D. Barry ed., 1992).
22. See id. at 47. This idea is captured by the aphorism: Auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem
(Authority, not truth, creates statutes).
23. As Berman rightly points out, the Rechtsstaat could theoretically be a fascist or dic-
tatorial state-there is no substantive prescription beyond the positivist procedural
requirements of rule by laws. Nazi Germany, the USSR, and Apartheid South Africa were all
states rich in laws, however unjust (i.e. un-Lawful) these laws were. Id. at 47.
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its 'own' law.,2 4 The self-binding notion of "government under law"
does not create the Rechtsstaat-not rule by laws-but the rule of
Law. Cass Sunstein's characterization of deliberative democracy as
"a republic of reasons" only partially captures this meaning. Eng-
lish loses a distinction that is better expressed in Latin (lex versus
jus), French (loi versus droit) or, for that matter, in Russian (zakon
versus pravo).
Development of rule of law conceptions, norms, and practices
has been difficult and slow in post-Soviet Russia.2" In the words of
Bernard Rudden, "[d] uring the last years of its life the Soviet Un-
ion turned to law like a dying monarch to his withered God."
26
Although undoubtably true that the Supreme Soviet and its succes-
sor, the Russian Duma, have engaged in a lawmaking campaign
"with the fervour of one who sees in legislation the path to para-
dise [,] ,27 that utopia is nowhere within reach, nor likely to be
grasped by the lawyer-politician. What did Mikhail Gorbachev
(who, incidentally, is a lawyer by training)28 mean exactly when he
famously expressed the need to return to a pravovoe gosudarstvo,
usually translated as "law-based state?"' Did he mean to go beyond
the Soviet Rechtsstaat, to demand rule by laws made legitimate by
something beyond the unanimity of Party-controlled parliamentary
assent? Did he mean a "rule of Law" state, a state held accountable
to pravo, i.e. jus? The "Theses" published prior to the Nineteenth
Communist Party Conference (which radically restructured elec-
toral procedures, and legislative and judicial institutions in June
24. Gianmaria Ajani, The Rise and Fall of the Law-Based State in the Experience of Russian
Legal Scholarship: Foreign Patterns and Domestic Style, in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN RUSSIA?
POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD 5 (Donald D. Barry, ed. 1992).
25. Between the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991 and the adoption
of a new constitution for the Russian Federation by popular referendum on December 12,
1993, the 1978 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was
still law, although subject to increasing (and sometimes contradictory) amendment. See
KAHN, supra note 17, at I n. 2. This is despite the aspiration expressed in the 1993 Russian
Constitution, which states: "The Russian Federation-Russia shall be a democratic, federal,
rule-of-law state with a republican form of government." KONST. RF art. 1, § 1 (1993). Hold-
ing Russia up to its own standard (and, no less, the standard that it has accepted by ratifying
the ECHR), one may deflect the criticism that expectations for reform have been set too
high. But see Michael McFaul, Getting Russia Right, FOREIGN POL'v 58, 58-62 (Winter 1999-
2000), for this alternative view.
26. Bernard Rudden, Civil Law, Civil Society, and the Russian Constitution, 110 LAW Q.
REv. 56, 56 (Jan. 1994).
27. Id.
28. See ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEV FACTOR 29-31 (1996).
29. The mere use of this phrase marked a turning point in Soviet history. Labeled for
seven decades a "bourgeois" concept, the term had been proscribed from permitted discus-
sions of Soviet law. See Donald D. Barry, Introduction in TOWARD THE "RULE OF LAW" IN




1988) made reference to the importance of a division of powers in
a rule-of-law state and established a constitutional review commis-
sion. In October 1988, Gorbachev asserted that this was the key to
reforms that could be characterized as "a legal revolution.
3 0
It became clear that Gorbachev was talking about something
new for the Soviet Union. Increasingly, the relationship between
state and law drew closer to conceptions of a rule-of-law state. The
future USSR Minister ofJustice Yakovlev explained in 1988:
The specific question is: what over what? The state over the
law or the law over the state? Despite the fact that the law is
born of the state, and has its sources in state institutions, the
state nevertheless becomes truly law-based when it places the
law above itself.
3
A transition in thinking about law and legal abstractions was as
important as the transition to the rule of law itself. It is unsurpris-
ing that, operating in the shell of a state built on the administrative
use of law as tool and weapon, inexperienced parliamentarians of-
ten resorted to instrumentalist Soviet legal habits. 3- According to
one scholar and early member of the Russian democratic opposi-
tion:
[W]hile arguing for the rule of law or a law-based state, 'de-
mocrats' saw law as a means of toppling the regime, as a tool
that should have been directed mainly against their Commu-
nist opponents, while they themselves did not feel bound by
30. Interv'iu M.S. Gorbacheva zhurnalu 'Shpigel' (FRG), [Interview with M.S. Gorbachev by the
magazine Spiegel (FRG),] PRAVDA, Oct. 24, 1988, at 1-2.
31. Berman, supra note 21, at 49 (quoting V.F. YAKOVLEV, ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON
THE MEANING OF A LAw-BASED STATE (1988)).
32. Perhaps the most famous (and horrifying) expression of this Soviet view is that of
the first Commissar ofJustice, N.V. Krylenko:
The court is, and still remains, the only thing it can be by its nature as an organ of the
government power-a weapon for the safeguarding of the interests of a given ruling
class ....
A club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the most efficient is the
court .... For us there is no difference between a court of law and summary justice.
... The court is an organ of State administration and as such does not differ in its na-
ture from any other organs of administration which are designed, as the court is, to
carry out one and the same governmental policy ....
1 VLADIMIR GsOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 241 (1948) (quoting N.V. KRYLENKO, THE JUDICI-
ARY OF THE R.S.F.S.R. 206 (1923)).
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what they considered to be outdated and unjust Communist
laws. 3
Soviet legal study for years had been steeped in the basic princi-
ples of Marxism-Leninism (e.g., law as an instrument of class
domination), dialectical materialism (including the forecast with-
ering away of all law and state administration), and the history of
the Communist Party.3 4 All the while, Russian lawyers were starved
of serious study of comparative law, constitutionalism, and federal-
ism. The Soviet lawyer "whether he be a convinced Marxist-
Leninist or not, of whatever disposition, his concepts of law, its ori-
gins, role, and purpose, have been affected by this intellectual
framework.
'5
There is no common law tradition in Russia, and thus, crucially,
no tradition of protecting individual rights through judicial re-
view.36 Though the development of Russian law has a long and
fascinating history, its course was profoundly different from either
the civil law traditions of continental Europe (from which it mainly
drew)37 or the common law traditions of England, Scotland, and
33. See Alexander V. Lukin, "Democratic" Groups in Soviet Russia (1985-1991): A
Study in Political Culture 323 (D.Phil. Dissertation, Oxford University, Faculty of Social
Studies, Trinity Term 1997) (available at the Bodleian Library, Oxford University).
34. SeeWILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 32, 129-34 (1999).
35. WILLIAM E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 27 (2d ed. 1988); see also HAROLD J. BERMAN,
JUSTICE IN THE USSR: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW (1966).
36. See AlbertJ. Schmidt, Soviet Civil Law as Legal History: A Chapter or a Footnote, in THE
REVIVAL OF PRIVATE LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FJ.M.
FELDBRUGGE 45-62 (George Ginsburgs et al. eds., 1996); see also I GsovsKI, supra note 32, at
259. The right to judicial review of administrative action (and inaction) is now (nominally)
guaranteed by the Russian Constitution. KONST. RF art. 46, § 2 (1993).
37. Interestingly, the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights notes
the existence of a "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of
law" shared by the governments of European countries. ECHR, supra note 3, at Preamble.
The European Court of Human Rights doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" (expressing
the view that the ECHR member-states are sufficiently different to require broad acceptance
of diverse practices), however, serves to undercut this striking assertion. The European
Court of Human Rights does not always set uniform and rigid standards "across-the-board"
for compliance with all Convention rights in all member-states. "A certain leeway or margin
of appreciation in deciding whether a violation exists" is part of the Court's methodology.
CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 217 (discussing the application of the Art. 14 freedom
from discrimination in matters ranging from taxation to family life to racial bias). This doc-
trine has been used by the Court in regard to admissibility decisions involving the Russian
Federation. The Court noted in Pitkevich v. Russia, App. No. 47936/99, at *20 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng, which in part involved the Art. 10
freedom of expression, that "[t] he Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in
assessing whether such a need [to restrict freedom of expression] exists [because necessary in a
democratic society]." The Court ultimately held Pitkevich's case inadmissible. Id. at *11.
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the United States. s In the Russian Empire, prior to the Judicial Re-
form of 1864, judicial opinions were neither published nor
circulated. 39 As legal experts from the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe concluded, in their report on Russian con-
formity with the fundamental principles required for full
membership in the Council of Europe (human rights, the rule of
law, and democratic pluralism): "The courts can now be consid-
ered structurally independent from the executive, but the concept
that it should in the first place be for the judiciary to protect the
individuals has not yet become a reality in Russia."40 This opinion
was relatively unchanged two years later, as noted by the Council's
rapporteur:
[T]he mentality towards the law has not yet changed. In So-
viet times, laws could be completely disregarded-party
politics and "telephone justice" reigned supreme. While it
cannot be said that laws are ignored as a matter of course in
present times, they are disregarded if a "better" solution to a
particular problem seems to present itself. This assertion is
valid for every echelon of the Russian state administration,
from the President of the Federation ... down to local offi-
cials....
[I] t is very difficult to enforce the law through the courts. Of-
ten, a complaint against administrative abuse cannot even be
brought to court, since the prosecutor's office is the compe-
tent state organ. But even when such cases are brought to
court, and the court rules against the administration, the
38. See, e.g., A.H. (Archie) Brown, The Father of Russian Jurisprudence: The Legal Thought
of S.E. Desnitskii, in RUSSIAN LAW: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 122, 123 (W.E.
Butler ed., 1977) (emphasizing the influence of German, Scottish, and English scholarship
on Russian legal education). See generally BUTLER, supra note 34, at 14-79.
39. William G. Wagner, Civil Law, Individual Rights, and Judicial Activism in Late Imperial
Russia, in REFORMING JUSTICE IN RUSSIA, 1864-1996: POWER, CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF
LEGAL ORDER 32 (Peter H. Solomon,Jr. ed., 1997).
40. Rudolf Bernhardt et al., Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian Fed-
eration with Council of Europe Standards, 15 HuM. RTS. L.J. 249, 287 (Oct. 31, 1994). In fact,
given the oversight of the judiciary by the executive branch Ministry of Justice for another
two years, "structural independence from the executive" is unduly optimistic. See infra note
41 and accompanying text.
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decision is sometimes not implemented due to the low stand-
ing courts and their decisions enjoy in public opinion.
The "founding fathers" of Russia's new constitutional system
were consigned to struggle with a Soviet legal legacy with few com-
42parative legal tools to guide them. In the Soviet era, from the
legal nihilism of "revolutionary legality" to the rigid formalism of
the Stalinist bureaucratic state, one of the few constants in legal
thought was the subordination of the judiciary, "hierarchically in-
ferior to parliament and to the executive." 3 It was only with the
adoption of the 1993 Constitution-in the aftermath of a violent
confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of
government-that judicial independence was, at least nominally,
acknowledged. Even then, it was not until passage of the 1996
Constitutional Law on the Judicial System that the traditional de-
pendence of courts of general jurisdiction on the Ministry of
Justice, which not only provided "logistical" support but also was
charged with " 'oversight' " of the ordinary courts, officially came
to an end.4
The second Russian president, Vladimir Putin (who, at least, at-
tended law school, albeit on assignment by the KGB), has not
alleviated anxiety about the level of appreciation that exists for the
rule of law. Early in his presidential campaign, Vladimir Putin in-
troduced a strange phrase into the political lexicon: "the
dictatorship of law.",46 Putin's speeches and writings on democracy
and law were at once encouraging and chilling. His use of democ-
ratic concepts often left unclear in what manner he thought them
best applied:
41. Opinion by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on Russia's Application for
Membership of the Council of Europe, Eur. Consult. Ass., 1996 Sess., Doc. No. 7463 (Jan. 18,
1996), reprinted in 17 HUM. RTs. L.J. 218, 218-19 (1996).
42. For an excellent and detailed examination of early Soviet legal concepts and "dis-
continuity" with pre-Revolutionary legal thought, see I GsOVSKI, supra note 32, at 152-262.
For an analysis of the continued intrusion of Soviet and early post-Soviet extra-legal "unwrit-
ten rules" on the conduct of state and private business, and their brake on economic and
legal reform, see ALENA LEDENEVA, UNWRITTEN RULES: How RUSSIA REALLY WORKS 38
(2001). The author catalogues corrupt, illegal, and often violent methods of conducting
state regulatory and private economic business, concluding that, to counter these practices
"it is simply not enough to transform the formal rules and the ways they are enforced." Id.
43. GENNADY M. DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 58 (1999).
44. See KONST. RF art. 10 (1993) (separation and independence of branches of gov-
ernment); id. at art. 120 (independence of the judiciary under law).
45. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 58-59..




In a non-law-governed, i.e. weak, state the individual is de-
fenseless and not free. The stronger the state, the freer the
individual [emphasis in original]. In a democracy, your and
my rights are limited only by the same rights enjoyed by other
people. It is on recognizing this simple truth that the law is
based, the law that is to be followed by all-from an authority
figure to a simple citizen.
But democracy is the dictatorship of the law-not of those
placed in an official position to defend that law ...
I know there are many now that are afraid of order. But order
is nothing more than rules. And let those who are currently
engaged in substituting concepts for one another, trying to
pass off the absence of order for genuine democracy-let
them, I say, stop looking for hidden dirty tricks and trying to
scare us with the past. "Our land is rich, but there is no order
in it", they used to say in Russia.
Nobody will ever say such things about us in future.47
Such statements sent shockwaves through Russia's weak democ-
ratic opposition. 8 Did the Russian president mean the "Rule of
Law," or a more frightening, bureaucratized rule through laws?
Was Putin's oxymoronic linkage of dictatorship and law compatible
47. Id.
48. Contrary to the assertion by Peter Rutland that this phrase was a "throw-away re-
mark that Putin made while talking to journalists," (Peter Rutland, Putin's Path to Power, 16
POST-SOVIET AFF. 345 (2000)) Putin has repeatedly expressed his well-known maxim of
government. In a televised address to the nation on the eve of his reform package, Putin
linked the phrase to his "strengthening of the vertical of executive power," saying: "This is
what the dictatorship of law means. It would mean we are living in one strong country, one
single state called Russia." Address (Russian public television broadcast, May 17, 2000) (BBC
Monitoring, trans.) reprinted in Vladimir Putin: Vlast'dolzhna byt'rabotaiushchei! [Vladimir Putin:
Power should be working.] Ross. GAZETA, May 19, 2000, at 3. In another televised speech on
July 8, 2000, before both houses of the Federal Assembly, Putin managed to give a funda-
mental concept of civil law-the importance of maintaining a space outside the domain of
public law-an ominous tinge:
That is why we insist on just one dictatorship-the dictatorship of the law, although I
know that many people dislike the expression. That is why it is so important to indi-
cate the boundaries of the domain where the state is full and only master, to state
precisely where it is final arbiter and to define those spheres where it should not
meddle.
Address (Russia public television broadcast, July 8, 2000) (BBC Monitoring, trans.). One is
left to wonder what size such a non-state sphere could have in Putin's Russia.
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with the tremendous act of self-restraint that is government under
law? The initial legal reforms of the Putin administration, particu-
larly in relation to the Tax Code, proposed Land Code, and federal
reforms, have been welcomed substantive changes. Anxiety has
remained, however, with regard to broader conceptions of gov-
ernmental restraint and the retention of a legal sphere-private
law-outside of governmental interference.49 Transition away from
authoritarianism, as well as the development of stable federal rela-
tions, hinged on that choice.
Undeniably, the weak development of rule of law conceptions in
Russia is perhaps the most fundamental issue with which to begin
analysis of Russia's compliance with the ECHR.50 Although such a
broad critique is hardly an actionable claim in any court system,
these conceptual failings underlie every particular concern over
specific human rights violations.5' Very practical problems--of par-
ticular salience in contemporary Russia-of sufficient resources
and the allocation of funds adequate to ensure prompt and effec-
tive justice also return to questions of a positive obligation to
ensure the rule of law.52 Pre-trial detention, arbitrary or capricious
administrative procedures, due process, equal protection-these
are all issues that, at their core, depend on acceptance of the
enormous act of self-restraint that is government under law.
49. As a highly respected authority on Russian politics has observed, Putin's first eight-
een months in office have been marked by the "selective application of the law," as a "lever[]
of power" against a weakly independent media, federal and regional political opponents,
and Russia's powerful financial oligarchs. Archie Brown, Vladimir Putin and the Reaffirmation
of Central State Power, 17 POST-SOVIETAFF. 48-49 (2001). "But what marks entrepreneurs and
governors who have incurred the wrath of the Kremlin is not that they contravened laws. It
would be difficult to find a major financier in Russia who had not done anything illegal or a
republican president or regional governor who had not infringed a federal law. What distin-
guished them, rather, from their more fortunate brethren was that they had failed the loyalty
test." Id. at 48 (italics in original). As displayed in the imprisonment of media-tycoon Vladi-
mir Gusinsky (which ended only following Gusinsky's forfeiture of his media holding to the
state-controlled gas conglomerate Gazprom), this approach can "hardly suggest commit-
ment to an impartial rule of law." Id. at 48-49.
50. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 7, § 2; id. at art. 13.
51. The observance of the rule of law is, obviously, a key principle behind Article 5 and
Article 6 of the ECHR. See infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
52. As will be discussed below in regard to Article 6, the European Court has held that
member-states may not plead lack of resources as an excuse for the delay or denial of a right
to trial (e.g., docket backlogs, and insufficient personnel). See Guincho v. Portugal, 7 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 223 (1984) (holding foreseeable problems of backlog and delay confronting legal
systems must be remedied by member-states to avoid violation of Article 6); see also
CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 160-62.
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II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND RUSSIAN LAW:
AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT
A. International Treaties in the Hierarchy of Russian Law
The Russian Federation Constitution establishes a monist sys-
tem, in sharp contrast to the dualist approach to international law
employed by the Soviet Union.53 The following articles of the Rus-
sian Federation Constitution are relevant. Article 15, § 4 states:
The generally recognized principles and norms of interna-
tional law and the international treaties of the Russian
Federation shall constitute an integral part of its legal system.
If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes
rules other than those established by the law, the rules of the
international treaty shall apply.
54
Article 17, § 1 states:
The rights and freedoms of the human being and citizen shall
be recognized and guaranteed in the Russian Federation in
conformity with the generally recognized principles and
norms of international law and in accordance with this Con-
stitution.55
Article 46, § 3 states:
Everyone shall have the right, in accordance with interna-
tional treaties of the Russian Federation, to apply to
international organs concerned with the protection of human
53. Generally speaking, a monist system is one permeated by international law without
the need for domestic legislative action. A dualist system requires that international treaties
and other obligations be given force of law by legislative enactment. For a discussion of the
monism/dualism debate in international law, see HARRIS, supra note 5, at 68-71. In relation
to Russia, see Article 5, § 3 of the Russian Law of Treaties: "The provisions of officially pub-
lished international treaties of the Russian Federation which do not require the publication
of intra-State acts for application shall operate in the Russian Federation directly. Respective
legal acts shall be adopted in order to effectuate other provisions of international treaties of
the Russian Federation." For an excellent English translation and commentary on the Law
of Treaties, see WILLIAM E. BUTLER, THE RUSSIAN LAW OF TREATIES (1997). For commen-
tary, see DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 34 n.62 and 41-47; see also G.M.
Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 451, 458-68
(1994).
54. KONST. RF art. 15, § 4 (1993).
55. Id. at art. 17, § 1.
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rights and freedoms if all available domestic remedies have
been exhausted."
Article 55, §§ 1 and 2 state:
1. The enumeration of fundamental rights and freedoms in
the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall not be inter-
preted to deny or diminish other generally recognized rights
and freedoms of the human being and citizen.57
2. No laws denying or diminishing the rights and freedoms of
the human being and citizen may be issued in the Russian
Federation.8
These are statements of constitutional law with enormous impli-
cations.59 First, Articles 17 and 55 may be interpreted to mean that
international law is superior to the Russian Constitution.60 Second,
Article 15 incorporates all international law into Russian domestic
law, not only the law created by ratified treaties but also "generally
recognized principles and norms" of international law, i.e. custom-
ary international law.6' Third, treaty norms are considered superior
to domestic federal, republican, and provincial law; customary in-
ternational law, however, is not given superiority.
6
1
According to Professor Gennady Danilenko, the Russian Federa-
tion Constitutional Court first based a decision on international
law in 1993.63 Danilenko notes that the Constitutional Court now
"invokes international law in almost all of its decisions concerning
human rights."6 A 1995 Russian Federation Supreme Court expla-
nation (which is binding on inferior courts) orders the direct use
of international law in judgments. 65 Another 1995 Russian Federa-
56. Id. at art. 46, § 3.
57. Id. at art. 55, § 1.
58. Id. at art. 55, § 2.
59. Butler calls this formal recognition and integration of international law into Rus-
sian domestic law "one of the most momentous changes of the twentieth century in the
development of Russian law." BUTLER, supra note 34, at 592.
60. Id. at 593.
61. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 33.
62. Id. In addition, Butler notes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been held to be "generally-recognised"
norms of international law. BUTLER, supra note 34, at 592.
63. See The Labor Code Case, Vestn. Konst. Suda RF, No. 1 (1993), excerpted in
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 34.
64. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 42 (citing remarks made by Danilenko
at the Ninety-First Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (1997)).
65. Id. at 43.
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tion Supreme Court explanation ordered inferior courts to make
direct use of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.66 Furthermore, courts may make use of the inter-
pretation given to treaties by international organs. Thus, in
connection with Russia's Council of Europe obligations, Danilenko
notes that there is "no bar to the domestic use of the interpretation
of the [European] Convention [of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms] advanced by the European Court of Human Rights.
The case-law of the European Court may thus be gradually trans-
formed into Russian domestic jurisprudence."67
In addition, Russian legislation has been passed with regard to
the domestic use of international law. The 1995 Law on Interna-
tional Treaties requires the immediate and direct application of
officially published treaties if no enabling legislation is required.6
Danilenko notes that this indicates that the Russian Federation
treats self-executing and non-self-executing treaties differently,
which could have a substantial impact on the use of different trea-
ties by the courts. 69 Treaties that are deemed to require domestic
enabling legislation may not be utilized by the courts.'y Finally,
Danilenko notes:
Under the existing Criminal Procedure Code, it is possible to
request the review of a conviction following a finding by in-
ternational organs by referring to a "new circumstance" or a
breach of "the law," a formula which may include violations of
international law. Similar considerations may be invoked in
71
civil cases.
It would appear that this reference to civil cases refers to Article
7 of the 1994 Civil Code, which states that international treaties
"directly apply" to civil relations, except in those circumstances
66. Id. at 49-50.
67. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 49; see also id. at 47-48 (translation of excerpt from Russian Supreme Court:
"Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 'On Some
Questions Concerning the Application of the Constitution of the Russian Federation by
Courts.' ").
70. Id. at 43-45 (noting that although the Russian Federation Constitutional Court ini-
tially seemed inclined to make no distinction between these two types of treaties, subsequent
legislative activity by the Russian Federation Duma created countervailing influences).
71. Id. at 47 n.74.
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that require enabling domestic legislation. 7' The ECHR does not
present such a circumstance.7
B. Russian Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights
As did virtually all states-signatories to the ECHR,4 Russia lodged
reservations at the time of its accession to the Convention. 75 Rus-
sia's two reservations both relate to conformity of its Soviet-era
Criminal Procedure Code7 , to the provisions of Article 5 of the
Convention." The Russian reservation is in two parts. The first part
72. Id. at 49.
73. Butler sees greater disagreement in the Russian legal community regarding the di-
rect use of international law. He cites Article 15(1) of the 1995 Law of Treaties, noting some
jurists argue that only ratified treaties are superior to Russian law. Treaties that are not rati-
fied, or not subject to ratification, "fall outside the scope of Article 15(4) of the 1993 Russian
Constitution and Article 5(1) of the 1995 Law on treaties." BUTLER, supra note 34, at 593-94.
A Supreme Court Plenum decree (October 31, 1995) adopts the view that other treaty rules
are to be applied only if made binding by federal law. Id. at 594. However, with regard to the
ECHR in particular, the combination of the treaty's own provisions for incorporation into
domestic law, enforcement mechanisms, and empirical treatment by both the Council of
Europe and Russian authorities of a growing docket of complaints, suggests there seems to
be little dispute about its direct applicability.
74. For a full list of all countries and conditions of accession to the ECHR, see Chart of
Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 1.
75. Reservations are permitted under ECHR. See ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 57. Reser-
vations may not be of a general character, must be in regard to a particular provision of the
Convention, and must contain a brief statement of the domestic law concerned. Id. It should
be noted that Russia did not lodge any declarations, authorities, territorial applications,
communications, or other objections to the ECHR, as did other member-states. See Chart of
Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 1.
76. Emerging from the rubble of the previous Soviet regime, the Russian Federation
was forced to operate a legal system governed by a mix of already existing Soviet laws and
newly minted post-Soviet ones. This peculiar situation was especially true with regard to
criminal law and criminal procedure law. In 1960, the then RSFSR enacted a Criminal Code
and a Criminal Procedure Code (in substance, virtually identical to codes enacted for the
USSR as a whole and other components of the Soviet Union). With numerous amendments,
revisions and repairs, these codes continued to operate after the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991. See Ugolovnyi kodeks RSESR. Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR. C izmeneniiami i dapol-
neniiami po sostoianiiu na 1 iiulia 1994 g [ Criminal Code of the RSbSRI Criminal Procedure Code of
the RSIS1, With changes and additions through 1 July 1994], (Izdatel'stvo BEK [Publishing
House BEK] (1994). Not until 1996 was consensus reached on a new Russian Federation
Criminal Code, which was passed to replace the old Soviet-era code. Because of heated dis-
putes in the drafting of the Criminal Procedure Code, however, not until 2001 has both the
substance and process of Russian criminal justice been governed by post-Soviet codes of law.
BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAw, supra note 34, at 550; DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 455.
77. In addition, at the time of publication, Russia has signed, but not ratified, the fol-
lowing Council of Europe treaties of particular relevance to the advancement of its Article 5
and Article 6 obligations: Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 16,
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concerns application of the Criminal Procedure Code to proce-
dures involving all persons under the jurisdiction of the courts of
the Russian Federation. The second part concerns only military
detention, in which case application to a Russian court is not al-
78
ways possible.
At the time of its accession, the Russian Federation had yet to
adopt a new Criminal Procedure Code. (A new Criminal Code, on
the other hand, was adopted in July 1996-effective January 1,
1997.) 79 A new Criminal Procedure Code became law in December
2001;80 however, most of the Code's provisions will not become
effective until July 1, 2002. l In addition, as noted below, several of
the Code provisions that are crucially important to bringing Russia
into compliance with its ECHR obligations may not become effec-
tive until January 1, 2004.82 Therefore, for the time being, Russian
criminal justice still operates under elements of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code of the now defunct Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (RSFSR) . This Code relied on the central role of the
procurators4 in virtually every stage of a criminal case, from arrest
1997, Europ. T.S. No. 114 and Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,Jan. 27, 1999, Eu-
rop. TS. No. 173.
78. Bowring, supra note 6, at 366. Both parts of the reservation are reproduced infra in
Appendix A.2 of this Note.
79. Ugolovnyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 63-FZ, [Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, Federal Law No. 63-FZ,] Sobr. Zakonod. RF, [Collected Legislation of the Rus-
sian Federation,] 1996, No. 25, Art. No. 2954, at 6007-6132. For an excellent English
translation, see CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (William E. Butler, trans., 3rd
ed. 1999).
80. On June 20, 2001, a draft Criminal Procedure Code passed its second reading (of
three) in the Duma, by a margin of 290-2. On November 22, 2001, it passed its third and
final reading-in the Duma. On December 5, 2001, it was approved by the upper chamber of
the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council, and on December 18, 2001, it became law.
For the legislative history, see http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/fz0l.HTM.
81. 0 vvedenii v deistvie, No. 177-FZ, [Federal Law No. 177-FZ], UPK RF [Code of
Criminal Procedure] art. 1 (2001), available at http://www.akdi.ru/gd/pekt/079044GD.SHTM.
82. Criminal Procedure Code Article 29 § 2, which transfers power over pre-trial de-
tention from the procurator to the judge, was slated to enter into force only on January 1,
2004. Id. at art. 10. However, as noted below, a surprising ruling by the Russian Federation
Constitutional Court ordered this entry deadline to be accelerated to July 1, 2002. Other
provisions, including those on the composition of certain courts (UPK RF Art. 30) and the
participation of the accused in certain procedures (UPK RF Art. 246) are to enter into force
in 2003. Id. at arts. 7-9.
83. This Code was first adopted in 1960, but has since undergone considerable
amendment. See CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 79, at xxi-xxii.
84. The procuracy, a uniquely Russian institution, combines the office of a criminal
prosecutor with that of a general ombudsman supervising the lawful operation of virtually
all ministries, agencies, and departments. The institution that ultimately became the procu-
racy was created in 1722 by Peter the Great, probably on the basis of the famous Czar's
junkets to Sweden, among other adventures. See BUTLER, supra note 34, at 172-86.
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to post-conviction-or even post-acquittal-review. 15 This fact
placed the old code into fundamental conflict with established
ECHRjurisprudence essential to Russia's eventual compliance with
European human rights norms."" Rapporteurs of the Council of
Europe repeatedly stressed the importance of drafting new codes
of criminal procedure (as well as codes of criminal law, civil proce-
dure, and a law on the penitentiary system)."' Citing the European
Court of Human Rights case Brincat v. Italy,88 for example, one
scholar noted that the ECHR does not recognize Russian procura-
tors as falling under the category of "other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power" for the purposes of arrest and de-
tention covered under Article 5, Section 3.9
What is to be made of the Russian reservations? On a positive
note, the mere fact that such a reservation was lodged prior to ac-
cession to the Convention implies awareness in Russian legal and
political circles of the dissonance between European and Russian
standards in these areas. The system of reservations is an entirely
proper method of signaling awareness of such noncompliance with
expected obligations under the Convention. The Russian reserva-
tion notes in particular that such applications are only
"temporary."90 Finally, as Article 57 of the ECHR specifically prohib-
its reservations "of a general character," the reach of Russian
noncompliance with human rights norms established in the Con-
vention must be particularized and specified in advance.
Reservations made with regard to Article 5, § 3, for example, can-
not be applied to other Convention articles.
On the other hand, the "temporary" state of affairs described in
Russia's reservation has now lasted for over four years. Reservations
to multilateral treaties are generally lodged because time is needed
to bring domestic law into conformity with treaty obligations.
However, as a rule, the practice of the offending domestic law is
85. 0 prokurature Rossiiskoi Federatsii, [On the Procuracy of the Russian Federa-
tion,] Sobr. Zakonod. RF, [Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation,] 1995, No. 47,
Art. No. 4472, at 8330-53. For commentary, see DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at
117-23, 512. These functions will be examined in greater detail below. See infra notes 116-87
and accompanying text.
86. Bowring, supra note 6, at 367.
87. Report of the Political Affairs Comm. on Russia's Request for Membership of the
Council of Europe, Eur. Consult. Ass. 1996 Sess., Doc. 7443 (Jan. 2, 1996) reprinted in 17
Hum. RTs. L.J. 187, 197 (Oct. 15, 1996).
88. Brincat v. Italy, 249 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1993) (holding that "if it then ap-
pears that the 'officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power' may later intervene, in
the subsequent proceedings, as a representative of the prosecuting authority, there is a risk
that his impartiality may arouse doubts which are to be held objectivelyjustified").
89. Bowring, supra note 6, at 367.
90. See infra Appendix A.2.
[VOL. 35:3
Russian Compliance
typically suspended while the law is changed.9' This was made diffi-
cult in the case of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, which
could hardly be suspended without implementation of a new law to
fill the legal vacuum. To the extent that these reservations stabbed
at the core of Article 5 guarantees of rights of liberty and security,
Russian exceptionalism in this area undermined many other as-
pects of Russian human rights. An argument might even be made
that, as expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, such reservations as recorded by Russia are "incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty."92 Further support for this
reasoning is found by analogy to General Comment 24 of the U.N.
Human Rights Committee.3
The new Russian Criminal Procedure Code, as will be noted be-
low, may make continuation of Russia's reservation to the ECHR
unnecessary. However, this is not to say that the Russian Federation
will withdraw the reservation, or that Russia will therefore be in full
compliance with its ECHR obligations. As noted below, a progres-
sive law on habeas corpus, passed almost a decade ago, is still
grossly underutilized by judges still operating in the conceptual,
social, and often physical remnants of the old Soviet system. And
91. According to Nuala Mole, General Comment 11 of the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mittee is generally seen as the basis for this understanding of reservations to human rights
treaties. Interview with Nuala Mole, Director, AIRE Centre, in Moscow, Russ. (July 6, 2000)
(on file with author). This Comment reads in part:
In view of the nature of article 20 [of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights], States parties are obliged to adopt the necessary legislative measures
prohibiting the actions referred to therein. However, the reports have shown that in
some States such actions are neither prohibited by law nor are appropriate efforts in-
tended or made to prohibit them.
General Comment 11, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 19th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1
(1994).
92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.TS.
331 (entered into forceJan. 27, 1980).
93. General comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Cove-
nant, General Comment 24, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 52nd Sess., 1382nd mtg. at § 12, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 /Add.6 (1994).
Reservations often reveal a tendency of States not to want to change a particular law.
And sometimes that tendency is elevated to a general policy. Of particular concern
are widely formulated reservations which essentially render ineffective all Covenant
rights which would require any change in national law to ensure compliance with
Covenant obligations. No real international rights or obligations have thus been ac-
cepted.
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although considered on their own, Russia's twin reservations from
Article 5 obligations regarding pre-trial detention and arrest are
particularly disheartening, one might consider these reservations
to be the tip of the iceberg-as the rest of this Note argues, there
are many more instances of Russian noncompliance with European
human rights obligations that are not subject to any pre-accession
reservations or subsequent derogations.
Finally, whether or not the reservation is withdrawn, it may be of
limited practical benefit to the Russian government. It is important
to make clear that Russia's fairly sweeping reservation was never-
theless of rather limited domestic effect. True, the Reservation, by
definition, prevents the European Court of Human Rights from
holding Russia in violation of specified provisions of the Conven-
tion. As already noted, however, Russian constitutional law places
international law (in both its treaty and customary law forms) at
the highest levels of Russia's legal hierarchy. There is nothing to
prevent a Russian lawyer from presenting violations of the Conven-
tion, and the European Human Rights Court's relevant caselaw, in
its arguments before a Russian court. Although the vast majority of
Russian judges are still likely to find such practice quite unfamiliar,
both the Russian Constitutional Court 4 and Supreme Court 95 have
deployed the Convention and ECHR caselaw in their own deci-
sions, encouraging lower courts to do the same. In some cases,
entire sections of the Criminal Procedure Code have been de-
clared by the Constitutional Court to be in violation of the Russian
Constitution. Even with its reservation, therefore, the impact of the
Convention on Russian domestic legal practice is potentially con-
siderable.
In a recent case (heard under the still-existing reservation),
Kalashnikov v. Russia,96 the Court was faced with an admissibility
decision on a complaint of detention on remand in excess of four
years. When the Russian Government sought to invoke its reserva-
tion to block admissibility, the Court noted the objection, but
nevertheless held the reservation was "closely linked to the merits
of the applicant's complaint," setting the case for hearing on the
merits. 97 How the reservation will affect the decision on the merits
must wait until the hearing and decision, scheduled to begin sum-
mer 2002.
94. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
96. App. No. 47095/99, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.echr.coe.int/.
97. Id. at *24.
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III. RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL LAW,
AND ARTICLES 5 AND 6
According to three leading European human rights practitio-
ners, Luke Clements, Nuala Mole, and Alan Simmons, "more than
half of all complaints to Strasbourg invoke Article 5 and/or 6.""
This general trend has been corroborated by leading Russian hu-
man rights lawyers in the particular case of Russia, as well.' This
section examines several key issues of dissonance between Russian
and European human rights and legal norms that are not the sub-
ject of Russian reservations to the ECHR. These include matters of
habeas corpus and pre-trial detention; rights to a speedy trial and
an adequate defense; problems of double jeopardy; and the cur-
rent moratorium on the death penalty-a direct result of Council
of Europe requirements.
It should be noted at the outset that criminal law and procedure
in the Russian Federation differs from Anglo-American preconcep-
tions of those subjects in two important respects. First, the Russian
system is for the most part based on an inquisitorial-rather than
adversarial-approach to matters of criminal justice. This system is
a function of historical ties to continental European approaches,
ties that date back to Peter the Great.'00 Thus, comparisons be-
tween the American and Russian models of criminal justice, for
example, may be of less value than comparisons with French or
German models, with which there is more in common. That said,
the more immediate Soviet legacy is a second, highly salient fea-
ture that must be kept in mind. Although ideology-driven
normative prescriptions have largely been eradicated from the
Russian criminal justice system, both Soviet-era personnel and hab-
its continue to affect the system. As William Butler has observed
with regard to the Criminal Procedure Code:
The object of the proceedings likewise may differ; they are
not merely to expose crimes expeditiously, convict the guilty,
and ensure the proper application of the law. The legacy of
98. See CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 139.
99. Interviews with attendees at the 2000 ECHR Summer School sponsored by the
Council of Europe, in Moscow, Russ. (Summer 2000) (cited on condition of anonymity) (on
file with author).
100. See generally NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 227-28, 230-34 (5th
ed. 1993) (explaining how the roots of this system were established when Peter the Great
adapted European institutions to the Russian situation).
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the Soviet past remains in the Code and speaks of using
criminal procedure to strengthen legality, assist crime preven-
tion, and help nurture and educate citizens to obey and
respect the law.'
A. Habeas Corpus and Pre-Trial Detention
The Russian Federation detains more people in its penitentia-
ries than any other country in the world. 10 2 According to the U.S.
State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and La-
bor, citing January 2001 statistics of the Public Center for
Penitentiary Reform, 1,060,000 people are detained in penitentia-
ries or other facilities run by the Ministry of Justice.0 3 Of this
number, approximately 280,000 people are confined to Special Iso-
lation Facilities in pre-trial detention. 10 4 Conditions in these grossly
overcrowded institutions are, by all accounts, abominable.'0  Nine
years after the passage of a federal law that extended review of
unlawful detention beyond criminal investigators and procurators
to independent judges-the Russian equivalent of habeas corpus
review-the law has been grossly underutilized by ajudiciary still in
the grips of old thinking, Soviet-era personnel, and both chroni-
cally underfunded and hopelessly overextended.
0 6
101. BUTLER, supra note 34, at 243.
102. According to the report of Oleg Mironov, Plenipotentiary for Human Rights in the
Russian Federation, more than 700 people per 100,000 were detained, exceeding Western
Europe, on average, by factors of seven to fifteen. At the time of publication, Mironov re-
ported 330,000 people in pre-trial detention. Bowring, supra note 6, at 373 (citing the First
Annual Report of the activities of the Plenipotentiary for Human Rights in the Russian Fed-
eration dated Feb. 10, 1999).
103. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUN-
TRY REP. ON HUM. RTS. PRACS. 2000: RUSSIA (Feb. 2001),
http://urw.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2OOO/eur/. It should be noted that, in addition to the
Ministry ofJustice, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Edu-
cation of the Russian Federation all maintain penal institutions. Id.
104. Id. There are 195 of these facilities in the Russian Federation. In addition, ap-
proximately 65,000 people are held in police detention centers. Id.
105. The conditions of Russian penitentiaries and detention centers might raise admis-
sible claims of violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the prohibition of torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment, or punishment. Recently, Russian Deputy Minister of Justice Yuri
Kalinin admitted to ITAR-TASS that conditions of pre-trial detention in Russia were "equal
to torture" and must be brought into conformity with Council of Europe standards as
quickly as possible. See Paul Goble, Detention Center Conditions 'Equal to Torture', 5 RFE/RL
NEWSLINE, Apr. 27, 2001, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/search/.
106. For an excellent analysis of this amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code and
its (lack of) effects, see Todd Foglesong, Habeas Corpus or Who Has the BodyJudicial Review of
Arrest and Pretrial Detention in Russia, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 541, 559-68 (1996).
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Whether a person is arrested as a result of an investigation, or an
investigation follows an arrest for which there is immediately suffi-
cient evidence to label the person a suspect (podozrevaemyi), the
Russian Constitution, Criminal Procedure Code, and a federal law
on detention set strict constraints on the nature and period of de-
. 107
tention. Article 22, § 2 of the Constitution states: "Arrest,
detention and custodial confinement shall only be permitted pur-
suant to a judicial order. Absent such an order, no person may be
detained for more than 48 hours. """' This plain language of the
Constitution acquires an aspirational tone, however, due to Part
Two "Transitional Provisions" of the Constitution, which extends
the life and legal supremacy of existing (i.e. Soviet-era) criminal
procedures.0 Russia's Reservation to the ECHR likewise reflects
this retention of the old procedures and norms."0
The still-functioning Soviet-era Criminal Procedure Code"'
grants the criminal investigator seventy-two hours of interrogation,
detention, and investigation before a "suspect" must be either re-
leased or reclassified as an "accused" (obviniaemyi). Within the first
twenty-four hours of this period, written notification must be made
to the procurator about the detention. 12 To the credit of the
107. "0 soderzhanii pod strazhei podozrevaemykh i obviniaemykh v sovershenii prestu-
plenii" (v red. Federal'nogo zakona ot 21.07.98 N 117-FZ), [On detention of suspects and
accused in perpetration of a crime, (in the redaction of the Federal law ofJuly 7, 1998, No.
117-FZ)], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, [Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation], 1998, No.
29, Art. No. 2759, at 5226-47.
108. KONST. RF, art. 22, § 2 (1993).
109. Section 6 of the "Concluding and Transitional Provisions" in Part II of the Consti-
tution states: "Until the criminal procedure legislation of the Russian Federation is brought
into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution, the former procedure for arrest,
custodial confinement and detention of persons suspected of having committed a crime
shall be preserved." KONST. RF, pt. 2, § 6 (1993).
110. Foglesong notes, for example, how accounting practices for reducing crime statis-
tics may have helped drive police practices contrary to ECHR norms. A crime is "solved"
once charges have been lodged against a suspect:
In most cases credible charges can be laid only after an initial interrogation of the
suspect, therefore the innovation in accounting procedures gave police considerable
incentives to arrest suspects more often.
[The Procuracy] has strong incentives to overlook violations of the law in the work of
the police if they contribute to the impression that the war against crime is being
waged successfully.
Foglesong, supra note 106, at 551-52.
111. Seesupranote 76.
112. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 466 n.28. With regard to Article 122 of
the post-Soviet revision of the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code, Danilenko notes that the
Code permits an additional ten days of detention in " 'exceptional situations' " to determine
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Russian Constitutional Court, attempts by regional governments to
extend this period still further have been rebuffed as unconstitu-
tional.13  Following re-classification as an "accused," pre-trial
detention (zakliuchenie pod strazhu) in Russia may amount to a pe-
riod of several years.14 Hard to quantify but reliable analysis
suggests that such lengthy pre-trial detention increases the likeli-
hood of final conviction.
In the Russian system, the decision regarding initial confine-
ment in custody and pre-trial detention rest with the procurator,
not with the judge." 6 Such authority is in conflict with the European
case law on pre-trial detention. A judicial officer must be com-
pletely independent of executive-enforcement functions to qualify
as the 'judge or other officer" authorized to "exercise judicial
power" in the question of detention."7 A procurator, because of his
role in investigation, oversight, prosecution, and potential appeal
in a criminal case, does not qualify, nor do his subordinates (e.g.,
criminal investigators). Citing the European Court of Human
whether a "suspect" should become an "accused." Id. At least one draft of the Soviet-era
revised Criminal Procedure Code, however, eliminated this 240-hour extension. UPK RF
[Criminal Procedure Code] art. 122 (1994).
113. Delo o proverke konstitutsionnosti punkta 'b' chasti pervoi stat'i 1 Zakona Respub-
liki Mordoviia, ot 20 ianvaria "0 vremennykh chrezvychainykh merakh po bor'be s
prestupnost'iu," [Russian Federation Constitutional Court Case re: the Constitutionality of
the Statute of Mordovia dated Jan. 20, 1996, "On Temporary Emergency Measures in the
Fight against Crime"] Vestn. Konst. Suda RF, 1997, No. 5 at 25-30 (holding that, despite its
characterization as "administrative detention," a procurator may not detain a person sus-
pected of membership in an organized criminal group for thirty days because this
constitutes both an unconstitutional violation of the presumption of innocence as well as
unconstitutionally long detention).
114. An eleventh hour amendment to the revised post-Soviet Criminal Procedure Code
permits extension of pre-trial detention beyond the normal limit of up to an additional
eighteen months only for "particularly grave crimes" ("osobo tiazhkye prestupleniia") by order
of the General Procurator. See 0 vnesenii izmeneniia v stat'iu 97, No. 183-FZ, [Federal Law
No. 183-FZ,] UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] (2001), published in Ross. GAZETA, Dec.
22, 2001, available at http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/08797GD.SHTM. The amendment
entered into effect on January 1, 2002, and, absent further legislation, will operate until the
effective date of the new Criminal Procedure Code.
115. To the extent that this is an indication that lengthy periods of pre-trial detention
decrease or reverse the presumption of innocence, this itself might be a violation of the
ECHR. Article 5, § 3 and Article 6, §§ 1-2 provide for the presumption of innocence and the
right to a fair and speedy trial. See for example, Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 18, 2001), http://ww.echrcoe.int/, the most recent case involving these
articles.
116. See UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] arts. 96, 97, 122 (1994); see also
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 477. (Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the
Criminal Procedure Code are of the current, i.e. Soviet-era, law.)
117. Brincat v. Italy, 249 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1993) (holding that "if it then ap-
pears that the 'officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power' may later intervene, in
the subsequent proceedings, as a representative of the prosecuting authority, there is a risk
that his impartiality may arouse doubts which are to be held objectivelyjustified").
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Rights case Brincat v. Italy,"" Bowring notes that the ECHR does not
recognize the procurator as falling under the category of "other
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" that appears in
Article 5, Section 3."" Indeed, there are good reasons to be circum-
spect of the role of procurators in the decision to detain an
individual. In clear violation of the ECHR protection of the pre-
sumption of innocence120 are public statements by authorities
about the likelihood of guilt of those arrested or detained or
charged with a crime. The statement of a former director of the
FSB (formerly KGB) that "I'm all for the violation of human rights
if the human in question is a bandit or a criminal"12' would not
meet with much support in Strasbourg. Made with regard to a par-
ticular defendant, such a statement would be a clear violation of
the ECHR and would be seen to invalidate any subsequent trial.
The 2001 Criminal Procedure Code, to its credit, will radically
change this practice when Article 29, § 2 comes into force. Under
the new Code, the court, not the procurator, determines whether
these "means of restraint" (mery presecheniia) will be used against
the accused (and in extraordinary cases, a suspect) .2 As one might
expect, the Code met with strong opposition from procurators,
from whom it also will take away the autonomous power to issue
arrest and search warrants, transferring the same power to the
courts.' 23 Russian lawmakers expected that such a radical departure
from long-standing practice by prosecutors would require a transi-
tional period. The law implementing the new Criminal Procedure
Code, therefore, established a transitional period for judges,
prosecutors, and other personnel in the criminal justice system to
adapt to the new Code. While the bulk of the Code would come
into force on July 1, 2002, the new judge-centered practices con-
trolling pre-trial detention would not come into effect for another
eighteen months, onJanuary 1, 2004.124
118. Id.
119. Bowring, supra note 6, at 367.
120. ECHR, supra note 3, art. 6, § 2.
121. Foglesong, supra note 106, 550 n.32 (citingJohn Lloyd, Crime Action Splits Russians:
Crisis Decree Could Revive the KGB, FINANCIAL TIMES (London) June 27, 1994, at 3).
122. See No. 174-FZ [Federal Law No. 174-FZI, UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure]
art. 29 § 2 (2001); id. at art. 37 § 2 (5); id. at art. 101 § 1; id. at 108 §§ 3-4.
123. See Victor Yasmann, Duma Approves New Criminal Procedures Code on Second Reading, 5
RFE/RL NEWSLINE,June 21, 2001, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/search/.
124. See 0 vvedenii v deistvie ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii
(No. 177-FZ), [On introduction into force of the criminal procedure code of the Russian
Federation (Federal Law No. 177-FZ)], UPK RF art. 10 (2001) published in Ross. GAZETA,
Dec. 22, 2001, No. 249, available at http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/079044GD.SHTM.
SPRING 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law ReformV
In a surprising-and inspiring-decision (postanovlenie) by the
Russian Federation Constitutional Court, however, this transitional
period was struck down.125 The Court heard petitions from several
Russian citizens who had been named "suspects" in criminal cases
and placed in pre-trial detention by order of the procurator. The
citizens maintained that this action violated Article 22 of the Rus-
sian Constitution: "arrest, detention and custody shall be permitted
only by authority ofjudicial order."2 6 Due to the transitional provi-
sions of the Russian Constitution, however, Article 22 had been
widely held to be in a state of suspended animation pending the
adoption of new laws to replace the Soviet criminal procedure
code. 27 Although the new Russian Criminal Procedure Code did
finally replace its outdated Soviet predecessor, it was to be imple-
mented only gradually. 28 The Court, however, put an end to this
gradualism, making repeated and direct citation to the European
Convention on Human Rights, specifically Article 5, Sections 3 and
4.129 The Court ruled that, a new law of criminal procedure having
been passed, the transitional period established-in the Constitution
was over; new transitional periods for the law itself could not be
tacked on to the one that had just tolled. 30 The Court directed the
Federal Assembly that the provisions of the new Criminal Proce-
dure Code establishing judicially controlled pre-trial detention
must enter into force on July 1, 2002, along with the rest of the
Code.1
3 1
Even with a new Code in place, however, actual compliance is
not guaranteed (as the experience of the neglected law on habeas
corpus suggests). The intended phased implementation of the
Code (adoption of measures regarding pre-trial detention were left
125. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Po delu o proverke konsti-
tutsionnosti statei 90, 96, 122 i 216 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa RSFSR v sviazi s zhalobami
grazhdan S.S. Malenkina, RN. Martynova i S. V Pustovalova," [Decision of the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation "Case on the constitutionality of articles 90, 96 122 and 216
of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR in connection with the complaints of citizens
S.S. Malenkin, R.N. Martynov and S.V. Pustovalov"], Mar. 14, 2002 [hereinafter Case of
Malenkin, Martynov, & Pustovalov]. At the time of publication, the Constitutional Court had
not published its decision on its website or in the official government newspaper, the Ros-
siiskaya Gazeta. The copy of the decision used in this Note is available at
http: //www.garant. ru.
126. KoNsT. RF, art. 22, § 2 (1993).
127. KONST. RF, pt. II, § 6 (1993) ("Concluding and Transitional Provisions" established
a transitional period during which, prior to the passage of a new law of criminal procedure,
the existing Soviet criminal procedures would be enforced, notwithstanding the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the new Constitution.).
128. See supra note 76.
129. Case of Malenkin, Martynov, & Pustovalov, supra note 125, at *2.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. at *4-5.
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a full eighteen months later than most of the Code) is indirect evi-
dence of concern for its effect "on the ground.' 132 Two important
issues related to this timeline of arrest and detention, regardless of
which Criminal Procedure Code may be used, involve practices
reportedly used to delay the processing of cases by Russian po-
lice. 3 3 First, the current Russian Criminal Procedure Code extends
to the police a seventy-two hour period of detention from the time
when the police protocol has been drafted, not the time of arrest.
However, Russian lawyers report that up to twenty-four hours may
pass before such a protocol is actually written, despite the fact that
a person already has been detained. Since the protocol is not, in
their experience, written immediately, the actual time of detention
is longer than the official time of detention. 134 Second, several Rus-
sian human rights lawyers noted a Kafka-esque dilemma that
confronts them in representing clients detained by police or
criminal investigators. The Procurator is required to forward mate-
rials to the judge within twenty-four hours; 135 a courier or other
interagency means of delivery to the court building are typically
used. When confronted with a habeas corpus-style motion, however,
the judge may claim not to have received materials that the prosecu-
tor claims to have sent-neither official, therefore, accepts the
timeliness of the defense counsel's petition for review. Citing a study
by the State Legal Administration conducted in 1993, Professor
132. At an informal meeting with five current Russian judges specializing in criminal
cases, the author was told that both financial and psychological impediments were cited as
reasons for this gradual adoption. One judge expressed the opinion that the immediate
adoption of court-supervised pre-trial detention would require the doubling ofjudges in the
Russian criminal justice system and an extraordinary expenditure of resources. Another
judge noted that the shift in power from the procurator to the judge would need to be done
gradually for the simple reason that neither group of court officials currently possessed the
education, experience, and even mentality for an abrupt change. Gradualism, not shock
therapy, was the best approach. Interview with judges from Azov, Rostov, Ulyanovsk, and
Vologda, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Mar. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
133. Interview with Russian human rights lawyers at the Council of Europe Summer
School, in Moscow, Russ. Uuly 2000) (cited on condition of anonymity) (on file with au-
thor). These statements are based on the lawyers' experience defending clients in the
Russian criminal justice system.
134. Article 122, § 3 of the Criminal Procedural Code lists the required contents of the
protocol (indicating the basis, motive, hour, day, month and year, place of arrest, explana-
tion for arrest, time of composition of the protocol) and requires that "in the course of
twenty-four hours to make a written communication to the procurator." The procurator
then has eight hours from the moment he receives notification to either sanction the con-
finement or free the detainee. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 122 (1994).
135. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 220 § 1 (1994) (addressing the appeal
in court of arrest or prolongation of the period of keeping in custody); see also DANILENKO &
BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 478.
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Foglesong corroborates the remarks made by Russian human
rights lawyers on the state of this malfeasance in 2000.136
Both Russian and European case law exists on these issues. The
broadest statement of the principle that the state is obliged to or-
ganize its judicial system to guarantee due process rights (such as
those enshrined in Articles 5 and 6) has been made by the Euro-
pean Court in the case of Guincho v. Portugal.137 In short,
inefficiency or lack of resources is no excuse for delays that violate
human rights. Russian case law has also been developed by the
Russian Federation Constitutional Court. According to the Case on
the Constitutionality of Articles 220(1) and 220(2) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code,138 no limitation may be placed on the categories of
persons permitted to file suit to contest a detention order, nor may
a limitation be placed that complaints will only be heard by a court
where the detainee is lodged.
The positive effect of the European Convention on Russian ju-
dicial interpretation was made clear in an April 20, 1999 decision
[postanovlenie] of the Russian Constitutional Court. 39 Coinciden-
tally, the decision nearly corresponded with the anniversary of
Russian ratification of the Convention. In this case, combining the
inquiries of two lower courts about the constitutionality of extend-
ing periods of arrest in order to conduct supplementary
investigations, the Constitutional Court specifically cited Article 6
136. See Foglesong, supra note 106, at 560-61:
According to a study commissioned by the State Legal Administration of the Presi-
dent in the Summer of 1993, while jail administrators promptly reported complaints
to procurators (perhaps because of pervasive overcrowding), in about only one-third
of the cases were materials delivered to the courts within the twenty-four hour time
limit. Less than half (42 percent) made it to court within three days, and only two-
thirds arrived within five days. In the words of the Supreme Court, the time require-
ments of the law were "completely ignored" by the procuracy.
137. 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 223 (1984) (holding foreseeable problems of backlog and delay
confronting legal systems must be remedied by member-states to avoid violation of Article
6); see supra note 52, and accompanying text.
138. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 478-80 (reproducing and translating
Vestn. Konst. Suda RF, 1995, No. 2/3, a case holding that a person ordered detained, but for
whom an order was never executed, may nevertheless challenge the legality of his detention,
notwithstanding the criminal procedure code limitations on venue and classes of persons
entitled to file).
139. Delo o proverke konstitutsionnosti polozhenii punktov 1 i 3 chasti pervoi stat'i 232, chasti
chetvertoi stati 248 i chasti pervoi stat'i 258 Ugolovnoprotsessual'nogo kodeksa RSFSR v sviazi s
zaprosami Irkutskogo raionnogo suda Irkutskoi oblasti i Sovetskogo raionnogo suda goroda Nizhnii
Novgomd [case re: the examination of the constitutionality of article 232, part 1, points l and
3; article 248, part four; and article 258, part one of the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code in
connection with the inquiries of the Irkutsk District Court of Irkutsk Oblast' and the Soviet
District Court of the city of Nizhnii Novgorod], Vestn. Konst. Suda RF, 1999, No. 4, at 40-49.
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of the ECHR in its discussion of legal norms governing the inter-
pretation of the Russian Constitution and Criminal Procedure
Code. The Court held:
Under these circumstances the extension of the maximum
period of arrest, which is brought about by the return of the
case for additional investigation, is disproportionate to the so-
cially justified aims of this measure of restraint and violates
the right of the accused to judicial examination in a reason-
able period of time or to timely release from prosecution, i.e.
it is not in agreement with Articles 46 and 55 (parts 2 and 3)
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and also with
Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.1
4 °
Aside from the discrepancy between Russian and European ac-
cepted practice as to the permitted length of pre-trial detention,
Russian law also has far broader grounds for detention than the
ECHR. Under the ECHR, any detention, regardless of the claimed
justification, is only permissible if "in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law."' 4' Article 5 reiterates the crucial matter again in
§ 1 (c) that a detention must be "lawful." 42 As a condition prece-
dent and above any domestic law criteria, detention is lawful only
when "effected for the purpose of bringing [the person] before
the competent legal authority.' 43 The only grounds on which de-
tention is then permitted are those based on "reasonable
suspicion" that a person has committed an offence,'44 or when "rea-
sonably considered necessary" to prevent an offence,'4' or to
prevent flight after an offence has been committed. 46 On the other
hand, the Russian Criminal Procedure Code (both the current and
140. Id. at 48.
141. ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 5, § 1.
142. Id. at art. 5, §1(c). The European Court clarified its interpretation of this require-
ment in Loukanov v. Bulgaria, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 138-39 (1997) (holding that detention
of a former Bulgarian minister for participation in the grant of state loans was not a criminal
offense and therefore "not 'in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law' ").
143. ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 5, § l(c).
144. The European Court's interpretation of "reasonable suspicion" has been a narrow
one. See, e.g., Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. U.K., 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A, No. 182) 157,
168-70 (1991) (holding that the "honestly" held belief by police that petitioners were terror-
ists did not rise to the level of "reasonable suspicion" sufficient for detention).
145. Preventive detention is permitted only if done with the intent to arraign the de-
tainee promptly before a judge and if done in response to the commission of specific acts,
not to general suspicions of criminality. See CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 143.
146. ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 5, § I(c).
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the new code) provides a much wider array of grounds for deten-
tion: detention is permitted in both versions when "the existence
of other information [innie dannie] provides a basis for suspecting
the person of committing a crime."47 This "other information" may
include cases of police confrontation of a person who subsequently
attempts flight, a person who lacks permanent residence, or a per-
son unable to prove his or her identity. 48 The new Code goes even
further, providing that the procurator can request pre-trial deten-
tion on other grounds beyond those enumerated in this section
upon successful petition to the court. 49 Also in potential conflict
with the Convention, Article 89 of the Criminal Procedure Code
(recodified as Article 97 of the 2001 Code) provides a much
broader standard for the detention of an accused: in addition to
"sufficient grounds to believe" that flight or further criminal con-
duct is likely, potential interference with the investigation is also an
acceptable basis for detention. So, too, is detention in order to
guarantee the execution of a future sentence. 50 One can imagine
147. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 122, § 3 (1994), recodified as UPK RF
art. 91, § 2 (2001) (describing the detention of someone suspected in the commission of a
crime); see also DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 466.
148. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 122, § 3 (1994) ("Given other informa-
tion, which gives foundation to suspect a person of commission of a crime, he may be
arrested only in the case where that person attempts flight or when he does not have a per-
manent residence or when he cannot establish his identity."); see also Foglesong, supra note
106, at 553-54.
149. UPKRF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 91, § 2 (2001) states:
Given other facts, giving foundation to suspect the person of committing a crime, he
may be detained, if this person attempts to flee, or does not have a permanent place
of residence, or his identity is not established, or if by the procurator, and also by the
investigator or inquirer with the agreement of the procurator, a petition is presented
in court about the selection in relation to the named person of measures of restraint
in the form of pre-trial detention.
150. SeeUPKRFart.89 (1994):
Given sufficient grounds to believe that the accused may disappear from the inquiry,
preliminary investigation or trial, or hinder the establishment of truth in the criminal
case, or may be engaged in criminal activity, and also for the guarantee that the sen-
tence is carried out, the person who has conducted the inquiry, investigator,
procurator and court have the right to employ one of the following measures of re-
straint of the accused: a written undertaking not to leave a place, personal guarantee
or bail of a social organization, confinement under guard [pre-trial detention].
The new Code, UPK RF art. 97, § 1 (2001), provides for pre-trial detention: "given suffi-
cient foundation to suppose that the accused: (1) will escape from inquiry, preliminary
investigation or trial; (2) may continue to engage in criminal activity; (3) may threaten a
witness, other participants in the criminal legal proceedings, destroy evidence or in some
other way impede the proceedings of the criminal case." Id. Further, UPK RF art. 97, § 2
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the frequency with which police and procurators would detain sus-
pects and accused persons on those ambiguous grounds, and the
difficulty for the defense of proving the negative, that the detainee
will not "impede" the investigation if freed, let alone the necessity
of guaranteeing a sentence that-presumption of innocence to
one side-has yet to be determined. In fact, as the Kalashnikov
case (described below) makes clear, the behavior of court authori-
ties sometimes manages even to defy imagination. Another
provision in conflict with Convention standards, the dangerousness
of certain offenses 1 -not the dangerousness of the alleged of-
fender-are grounds for pre-trial detention under the current
Code (but, thankfully, this provision appears to have been excised
from the new Code).52 These discrepancies are summarized on the
following pages:
(2001) provides: "Measures of restraint also may be chosen for the guarantee of the execu-
tion of a sentence." Id.
151. See UPK RF art. 96 (1994). Among the crimes listed as dangerous are: treason,
espionage, terrorism (of various forms), sabotage, rape, statutory rape, sodomy, kidnapping,
theft, robbery, swindling, extortion, bribetaking, various economic crimes, and drug
offences; see also DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 477.
152. For a defense of this practice, see the dissenting opinion ofJustice N.V. Vitruk, in
Delo o proverke konstitutsionnosti chasti piatoi stat'i 97 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa RSFSR v
sviazi s zhaloboi grazhdanina VV Shchelukhina [case re: the Constitutionality of Article 97(5) of
the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR in connection with the complaint of citizen V.V.
Shchelukhin] Vesm. Konst. Suda RF, 1996, No. 4 at 11. He writes:
More and more frequently in practice criminal cases have begun to spring up with a
large number of accused persons and perpetration by them of crimes (banditism,
robbery, rape, economic crimes, and other forms of organized, professionalized
criminality), the punishment for which is connected with protracted terms of depri-
vation of freedom and the death penalty. As a measure of restraint, fixed terms of
confinement proved ineffective.
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GROUNDS FOR DETENTION UNDER RUSSIAN LAW
AND UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
Conditions Precedent to Grounds for Detention
CURRENT RUSSIAN NEW RUSSIAN EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CONVENTION
CODE CODE
"shall be brought
promptly before a judge
or other officer
authorized by law to
Procurator, not the Court, Court, not the Procurator, exercise judicial power
considers and orders pre-trial considers and orders pre-trial .... "(Art. 5, § 3)
detention detention "for the purpose of





CURRENT RUSSIAN NEW RUSSIAN EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CONVENTION
CODE CODE
"person caught in the act of person caught in the act of
committing a crime or shortly po n agtine ac oftheraftr ... "committing a crim  or shortly
thereafter thereafter...." (Art. 91, § 1(Art. 122, § 1 (1)) (1))
"eyewitnesses, including "victims or witnesses indicate
victims, directly indicate the thgiens, cate ne w the given person as the one "reasonable suspiciongiven person, as the one who
who committed the crime...." of having committed ancom m itted the crim e .... (A .9 ,§ 1(2)of n e(Ant. 122, § 1 (2)) (Art. 5, § 1 (2)cofese(Art. 5, § 1 (c))
"on this person or his clothes,
"on the suspect, or on his in his proximity or in hisclothes, in his proximity or deln hr ilb
dwelling there will be dwelling there will be
discovered manifest signs of discovered manifest signs of
the crime .... " the crime."
(Art. 122, § 1 (3)) (Art. 91, § 1 (3))
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Grounds for Detention (Continued)
CURRENT RUSSIAN NEW RUSSIAN EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CONVENTION
CODE CODE
"Given sufficient grounds to
believe that the accused will
escape from inquiry,
preliminary investigation or
trial, or impede the
establishment of the truth in a
criminal case or will engage in
criminal activity, and also for
the guarantee of the execution
of the sentence.
(Art. 89)
dangerousness of the offense
(not the offender)
(Art. 96, § 2)
"Given other facts, giving
foundation to suspect a
person of committing a crime,
he may be detained only in
those cases if this person
attempts flight, he does not
have a permanent place of
residence, or when the
identity of the suspect cannot
be established."
(Art. 122, § 2)
"given sufficient grounds to
suppose that the accused will
escape from inquiry,
preliminary investigation or
trial, may continue to engage
in criminal activity, may
threaten witness, other
participants in the criminal
legal proceedings, threaten the
investigation, destroy evidence
or in other ways impede the
carrying-out of the criminal
case....
(Art. 97, § 1 (1)-(3))
"Measures of restraint may be
chosen as well for the
guarantee of execution of the
sentence."
(Art. 97, § 2)
"Given other facts, giving
foundation to suspect the
person of committing a crime,
he may be detained, if this
person attempts to flee, or
does not have a permanent
place of residence, or his
identity is not established,
or if by the procurator, and
also by the investigator or
inquirer with the agreement of
the procurator, in court
presents a petition about the
selection in relation to the
named person of measures of
restraint in the form of pre-trial
detention."





(Art. 5, § 1(c))
"reasonably considered
necessary to prevent
... fleeing after having
[committed offence]"
(Art. 5, § 1(c))
While there is obviously some overlap between similar catego-
ries, the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, old and new, is in every
case more sweeping and broader in its criteria permitting
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detention than the European Convention. This overbreadth is a
clear case of conflict between the two legal systems. Although Rus-
sia's reservation, noted above, preserves the right to use these
articles of the Criminal Procedure Code without violating its ECHR
obligations, this reservation must be viewed as it declares itself to
be: temporary. The new Criminal Procedure Code moves Russia
closer to compliance with the ECHR (particularly by reserving de-
cisions on detention exclusively to an independent judicial
officer), but shortfalls and large areas of nonfeasance-both in the
new Code as written and potentially as put into practice-remain.
B. Speedy Trials and Right to Defense Counsel
The ECHR permits only "lawful" detention. 15 3 If the detention
period is greater than that permitted by the law of the member-
state, by definition, it is not "lawful" and therefore in violation of
the ECHR. Excessively long periods of detention before trial may
also not be "lawful" in this sense, but it is also unlawful under the
more specific criteria of ECHR Article 5, § 3, which requires "trial
within a reasonable time or ... release pending trial."1 54 The case
law of the European Court of Human Rights places the burden on
the state to show "'relevant and sufficient reasons to justify deten-
tion.' ,1 55 With regard to the Russian Federation, what do such
subjective terms as "reasonable," "sufficient," and 'justify" actually
mean? It is clear that an argument of insufficient court resources
or a bottlenecked docket will not be deemed sufficient by Stras-
bourg.156 As leading practitioners in that venue have written,
"[e]ven where relevant and sufficient reasons exist, the Court will
review them in the light of the diligence shown by the authorities
in the conduct of the proceedings. The longer the delay, the
greater the justification required for rejecting release pending
trial.", 7 Article 5, § 3 is the subject of a reservation by Russia. 5
However, "reasonable suspicion" for detention arguably decreases
in the absence of, or with repeated delays in, the ongoing investi-
153. ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 5, § l(c).
154. Id. at art. 5, § 3.
155. CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 148 (citing Wemhoff v. ER.G., 1 Eur. H.R. Rep.
(ser. A, No. 7) 55 (1968)).
156. Both court-clog and insufficient resources are chronic problems in Russia. See Paul
Goble, Russian Courts Overwhelmed with Cases, 5 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Mar. 27, 2001, at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/search.
157. CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 149.
158. See reservations reproduced in Appendix A.2.
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gative activity of the procurator. Article 5, § 1 (c), therefore, may be
used to reach goals similar to those covered under Article 5, § 3.15
Courts in Russia's inquisitorial system of criminal justice privi-
lege the written report of the procurator (the "protocol") much
more than courts in adversarial criminal justice systems. It is the
core around which the entire criminal case revolves and, as such,
crucially important for the defendant to study with counsel. Under
the revised Soviet-era Criminal Procedure Code, ° the period of
time a detainee takes to familiarize himself with the materials in his
case (a task that may require considerable time) is not counted as
part of the time of pre-trial detention, and can even be extended in
the event of a failure by the detainee to familiarize himself in the
allotted time. The Russian Constitutional Court has held that this
rule is unconstitutional. 1 In its ruling the Court referenced not
only its own constitutional law (citing the "principle of proportion-
ality" embedded in Article 55, § 3 of the Russian Constitution), but
the relevant portions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Article 9, § 1). '6' The reaction to this ruling, how-
ever, did not resolve the problem; the Criminal Procedure Code
was amended to require an anticipatory motion by the procurator
to extend a term of pre-trial detention. Within five days, the judge
must either rule to extend the period of detention for a period not
longer than six months or release the detainee.
The 2001 Criminal Procedure Code requires that the accused be
given the materials in his case no later than thirty days before the
164
conclusion of his lawful period of detention. Failing this, the ac-
cused must be released, and his release does not impede his right to
continue to examine the materials in his case. 6 5 Notwithstanding the
159. CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 149.
160. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 97, § 5 (1994) reads: "The time for ac-
quaintance of the accused and his defender with the materials of the criminal case is not
counted in the determination of the period of detention."
161. Delo o proverke konstitutsionnosti chasti piatoi stat'i 97 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa
RSISR v sviazi s zhaloboi grazhdanina VV Shchelukhina [case re: Constitutionality of Art. 97(5)
of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR] Vestn. Konst. Suda RF, 1996, No. 4, at 2-10.
For the translation, see DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 483.
162. Id. (holding that "[in effect, the application of Art. 97(5) CrPC RSFSR renders a
nullity the law establishing a direct right to a judicial remedy at any point in the criminal
process for improper detention . ).
163. See id. at 485.
164. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 109, § 5 (2001) reads: § 5: "The mate-
rials of the completed investigation of the criminal case should be presented to the accused
in pre-trial detention and to his defender not later than 30 days before the conclusion of the
time-limit of detention..."
165. UPKRF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 109, § 6 (2001) reads:
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Constitutional Court's opinion in the Shchelukhina case, Article 109,
§ 7 permits the procurator to petition the court for extension of
this period in certain circumstances, the same as in the previous
amendment. 166
The right to legal counsel enshrined in Article 48, § 2 of the
Russian Constitution seems loosely to correspond to the require-
ments the European Court has established for the realization of
Article 6, Section 3(c) of the ECHR. One possible area of concern
is the right of the criminal investigator to refuse a request by de-
fense counsel to call a particular witness. 67 The European Court
has made clear that the defendant enjoys the same right as the
prosecution to summon and hear witnesses.
Russian practice of distinguishing between the rights of a "wit-
ness" [svidyetel] and a "suspect" [podozrevaiemi] poses serious
concerns to the right to legal counsel. Whereas a suspect (and, of
course, the accused) is accorded a right to counsel 69 and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination,17  the witness has no such
protection. 7 ' In fact, the witness is under a legal duty to assist the
If after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation the materials of the criminal
case were presented to the accused and his defender later than thirty days before the
conclusion of the time-limit of detention, than at its expiration the accused is subject
to immediate release. The accused and his defender preserve their right to examine
the materials of the criminal case.
166. UPKRF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 109, § 7 (2001):
In the event that, if after the completion of the preliminary investigation, the period
for presentation of the materials in the given criminal case to the accused and his de-
fender ... was observed, however thirty days for the acquaintance with the materials
of the criminal case does not appear sufficient, the investigator with the agreement of
the procurator of the subject of the Russian Federation has the right not later than
five days before the expiry of the time-limit for detention to petition for the exten-
sion of this period before a court of a subject of the Russian Federation or military
court of a corresponding level.
167. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 51(3) and (4) (2001); DANILENKO &
BuRNHAM, supra note 43, at 492 (suggesting that informal rules, e.g., the risk of remand by a
judge to continue investigation, may dissuade criminal investigators from exercising this
right).
168. SeeUnterpertinger v. Austria, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. (Ser. A, No. 110175) 175 (1986); see
also Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647 (1997) (holding a violation of Arti-
cle 6 in the use of anonymous police witnesses who did not testify).
169. KoNST. RF art. 48, § 2 (1993).
170. Id. at art. 51
171. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 56, § 4 (2001) (protecting the right
against self-incrimination, which includes the protection against giving evidence against
one's spouse and close relatives).
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criminal investigator in the collection of evidence. 7 2 As Professor
Danilenko notes, there is a slippery and indeterminate line be-
tween the witness and the suspect:
[I]f the person is called as a "witness," the criminal investiga-
tor warns that person that he or she is subject to criminal
charges for refusing to testify. If the person is called as a "sus-
pect" or "accused," the warning that should be given is a
radically different one-a warning against self-incrimination.
Thus, someone who is interrogated as a "witness" who should
be interrogated as an "accused" or a "suspect" will be advised
that they must testify on pain of criminal liability. In other
words, the situation is worse than the "accused" or "suspect"
simply not being advised of his or her constitutional right not
to testify. The "accused" or "suspect" is told erroneously that
he or she is required to testify.
Persons appearing as witnesses and warned that they must tes-
tify could easily cross the line at some point and become
"suspects"-perhaps based on testimony they were compelled
to give as "witnesses."'
7 3
From the point of view of the Convention, the implications of
this potential bait-and-switch are enormous. The Article 6 right to
an adequate defense is jeopardized.
The Russian Federation Supreme Court has already ruled that
the procurator risks the exclusion of evidence at trial if this line is
improperly crossed. 74 Recently, a case raising these issues was de-
cided by the Russian Constitutional Court, the Maslov case.175
Maslov was compelled to be conveyed to a regional law enforce-
ment authority dealing with organized crime, where he was held for
more than sixteen hours and subjected to a variety of investigatory
172. Article 308 of the Criminal Code provides sanctions for the refusal of a witness to
give testimony. See CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 79, at 175-76.
173. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 472-73.
174. See Postanovieniia prezidiuma i opredeleniia sudebnykh kolegii verkhovnogo suda Rossiiskoi
Federatsii, Verdikt koll.gii prisiazhnykh zasedatelei o nevinovnosti podsudimogo obiazatelen dlia predse-
datel'stvuiushchego sud'i, Biull. Verkh. Suda RF, 1996, No. 8, at 10. Reprinted and translated in
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 473-74.
175. Delo o proverke konslitutsionnosti polozhenii chasti pervoi stal'i 47 i chasti vtoroi stal'i 51
Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa RSFSR v sviazi s zhaloboi grazhdanina VI. Maslova [case re:
constitutionality of the provisions of part one of Article 47 and part two of Article 51 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR in connection with the appeal of citizen V.I. Maslov]
Vestn. Konst. Suda RF, 2000, No. 5, at 46-52 [hereinafter Maslov Case].
SPRING 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
activities, including interrogation. His request for the presence of
legal counsel was rejected by the criminal investigator, who, citing
Articles 47 and 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 7' noted that
Maslov was at that moment neither a suspect nor an accused, but
merely a witness. The Court held that the constitutional protection
of the right to counsel was not limited by a person's "formal proce-
dural status" in a criminal investigation. 7 7 In a remarkable
paragraph, the Court went beyond interpretation of the Russian
Constitution to cite international human rights norms established
in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.178 The Court then went on to cite not only Russian obliga-
tions under Article 6 of the ECHR, but specifically cited case law of
the European Court of Human Rights on the subject of the right to
counsel in the first hours of interrogation! 179 The importation of
ECHR norms and cases into the decision-making process of the
Russian Constitutional Court is a very positive sign in this otherwise
bleak recital of ECHR violations. The Court ultimately held the
investigator's interpretation of Article 47 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code to be unconstitutional but held Article 51 of the Code
not in contradiction to the Constitution in so far as its interpreta-
tion did not limit the right to counsel before the conclusion of a
criminal investigation. 
s°
176. UPK RF [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 47 (2001) permits the help of counsel
only from the moment a person is declared a suspect in a criminal case or a protocol for
detention is drawn up. The relevant section of UPK RF art. 51 (2001) interprets at what
stages of the process of an investigation a suspect or accused may, through counsel, examine
different products of the investigative record.
177. Maslov Case, supra note 175, at 52.
178. Id. at 50.
179. Among the cases the Court chose to cite were the Quaranta v. Switzerland (Series
A, No. 205, 1991), the Ymbrioscia Case (Series A, No. 275, 1993), Murray v. United King-
dom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1996), Eckle v. F.R.G., 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1982), Foti v. Italy,
5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 313 (1982), and Deweer v. Belgium, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 439
(1980).
180. The 2001 Criminal Procedure Code would seem to preserve this state of affairs.
While a witness possesses the constitutional right not to give evidence against himself (as
does a suspect or accused), he does not have the right to refuse to answer the call of an
inquiry officer, investigator, procurator or the court for interrogation. UPK RF [Code of
Criminal Procedure] (2001), supra note 81, at art. 56, § 6 (1) (2001). The 2001 Criminal
Procedure Code also makes clear that, absent a valid reason, refusal to appear may result in




The Russian Constitution permits the prosecution to appeal an
acquittal in a criminal case-even by verdict of a jury "-and to
request a retrial on the same charge: Article 50, § 1 of the Constitu-
tion specifies that no one may be "convicted" [osuzhden]-that is,
not merely "tried" [ispytan]-twice for the same crime. 11
This provision is in stark contrast to international law on the
subject of double jeopardy. Article 14, § 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: "No one shall be li-
able to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the
law and penal procedure of each country."8 3
Surprisingly, however, Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR would appear
to provide a lesser guarantee against double jeopardy. Article 4 of
Protocol 7 states: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished
again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same
State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted
or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
that State."8 4 What constitutes "finality," however, is the crucial
question, and one that seems to have been left to the domestic law
of states-parties to the Convention. Protocol No. 7 permits the re-
opening of a case on grounds of newly discovered evidence or a
fundamental defect in the earlier proceedings5 The practice of
remand for supplemental investigation by the criminal investigator,
whether utilized by the original trial court or upon cassational (the
"normal" appeal by the losing party, lodged before the court judg-
ment has entered into force, i.e. within seven days) or supervisory
review (appeal via "protest" of the procurator or chair or deputy
chairperson of a higher court regarding judgments that have en-
tered into force) on appeal, would seem to coincide with this
Convention obligation.
This is particularly surprising in light of Article 53 of the ECHR:
"Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or
181. Trial by jury is now available in only nine of eighty-nine regions in the Russian
Federation (the territories of Altai, Krasnodar, and Stavropol, and the provinces of Ivanovo,
Moscow (but not the City of Moscow), Riazan, Rostov, Saratov, and Ulianovsk). See
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 530 n.176.
182. KONST. RF, art. 50, § 1 (1993).
183. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 14, § 7, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
184. ECHR, supra note 3, at Protocol No. 7, art. 4, § 1.
185. Id. at Protocol No. 7, art. 4, § 2.
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derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental free-
doms which may be ensured under the laws of any High
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
Party."'8 6 As one legal scholar has observed, "the overall approach
to appeal and review remains essentially unaltered from the Soviet
era and therefore gives greater weight to public rather than to pri-
vate or individual interests. ,
8 7
IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND RUSSIAN LAW:
ACTIVITY IN STRASBOURG AND Moscow
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting in Strasbourg, is
the judicial body established by the ECHR to decide cases alleging
violation of the ECHR provisions.'8 The Court's jurisdiction ex-
tends to the interpretation and application of the ECHR,' 9
including allegations of breach of ECHR provisions made by one
member-state against another,' 9° as well as by individuals claiming
to be victims of breach by a member-state. '9' The Court screens
complaints made to it according to rigid criteria of admissibility.
92
Before a case may be heard on its merits, it must pass this first
stage.
Between May 1998 and June 2001, not a single Russian case was
declared admissible by the European Court of Human Rights.'
93
The dearth of admissible cases was not, however, for lack of com-
plaints. By the end of 1999, Strasbourg had received 1787
complaints alleging breaches in the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation. 94 An informed source at the Court notes that this
186. Id. at art. 53.
187. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAw, supra note 34, at 270.
188. ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 19.
189. Id. at art. 32.
190. Id. at art. 33.
191. Id. at art. 34.
192. Id. at art. 35. In addition to the requirements of exhaustion of domestic remedies
by a complainant within six months of the final decision of the alleged violation, the Court
may dismiss an individual application as "incompatible with the provisions of the Conven-
tion or the protocols," "manifestly ill-founded," or as "an abuse of the right of application."
See Eur. Conv. H.R. Art. 35, Sec. 3; CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 5, at 39-40. The Court em-
ploys four other measures of admissibility: ratione temporis, ratione materiae, ratione
personae, and ratione loci (dealing with, respectively, criteria of time, subject matter, per-
sonal and geographic jurisdiction). Id. at 14-24.
193. Interview with legal expert from the Eur. Ct. H.R. in Moscow (June 29, 2000)
(cited on condition of anonymity) (on file with author).
194. Bowring, supra note 6, at 375. This number is disputed. In a personal conversation
with the author, Marjorie Farquharson, former Programme Counsellor for the Russian Fed-
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number has skyrocketed. As of July 2001, over 6000 complaints
have been lodged against the Russian Federation. Over 1500 of
these complaints have been registered by the Court; 3000 await
processing; and 1500 have already been rejected as inadmissible by
committee. 95 According to the Russian judge sitting on the Court,
Judge Anatolii KovIer, the second largest area of complaint (after
pension cases) was under Article 6.1"6 Most of the complaints have
been rejected as inadmissible on grounds of ratione personae (e.g.,
complaints about Soviet-era violations against deceased relatives),
ratione materiae (e.g., complaints about pensions, housing or bank-
ing problems), or ratione temporis (complaints about a violation
committed prior to Russian accession to the Convention).""
It is of some interest, perhaps, that not all cases have been de-
clared inadmissible without the need for further investigation."
Even if a case is ultimately held to be inadmissible, the Court's pro-
cedures provide avenues for state action that may lead to a
cessation of alleged violation. The admissibility process after a
complaint has been registered by the Court is as follows: the Presi-
dent of one of the Courts Chambers (seven-member panels; the
forty member Court rarely sits in plenary session) assigns a judge
to act as a Rapporteur on the complaint (ideally a member of the
Court with some experience with the domestic law in question).
Based on the Rapporteur's report, the Chamber may declare the
complaint inadmissible or it may communicate the complaint to
the member-state concerned, requesting information. Following
the government's and complainant's response, an admissibility
hearing may be scheduled. According to a lawyer at the Secretariat
of the Court for Russian Federation cases, a number of cases (in-
cluding one regarding pre-trial detention) have at least been
eration and Ukraine, Directorate General of Human Rights for the Council of Europe noted
that the number of cases rejected as inadmissible in 1999 was 763 (July 4, 2000). It may be,
however, that the discrepancy is explained by the lag time between receipt and registry of
complaints with the Court and rejection as inadmissible.
195. Interview with a.legal expert of the Eur. Ct. H.R., Moscow (July 2001) (cited on
condition of anonymity) (on file with author).
196. Interview with A.I. Kovler, Rossiia zanimaet segodnia 5-6 mesto po kolichestvu zaiavlenii
ot grazhdan strany v Evropeiskii sud po pravam cheloveka, [ Today Russia is in 5-6 place in terms of
the number of applications from citizens of countries to the European Court of Human Rights], SOVET
EVROPY I RossIIA, [COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND RUSSIA], (2000) at 6-12; see also Bowring, supra
note 6, at 376.
197. Interview with Nuala Mole, Director of the AIRE Centre for Human Rights, in
London, U.K. (June 30, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mole Interview, June 30,
2000]. The AIRE Centre is the Council of Europe liaison office in the United Kingdom.
198. Interview with legal expert on the Eur. Ct. H.R. in Moscow (June 29, 2000) (cited
on condition of anonymity) (on file with author).
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communicated back to the Russian Government for a response.199
As of July 2001, forty-five complaints communicated to the Russian
Federation were currently pending.0 °
On June 21, 2001, the Court for the first time declared a Russian
case admissible, in the admissibility decision Burdov v. Russia.0 '
This case involved a Russian pensioner awarded compensation in
1991 for poor health due to his assistance in emergency operations
during the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe. The pen-
sioner, having won a civil suit in a Russian court in 1997 against his
local social services authorities for lack of payment over the course
of the past six years, nevertheless failed to receive any of the funds
due to him until March 2001 (when, following initiation of this
ECHR action by the applicant, the Russian Government paid the
debt). The Court noted that, the Russian Government not having
specifically acknowledged a violation of the applicant's rights un-
der the Convention, mere fulfillment of the pecuniary aspect of
the claim was insufficient to dismiss the action. The complaint to
the European Court was ordered to be heard on the merits regard-
ing a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol One (Protection of Property) to the Convention.
In a remarkable decision as this Note went to press, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights doubled the historical significance of
the Burdov case by making it not only the first admissibility decision
to be made against Russia, but also the first case against Russia to
be decided on its merits and just satisfaction awarded for a viola-
tion of rights under the ECHR. On May 7, 2002, two years after
making application to the European Court of Human Rights, six
years after his first legal victory in the Russian legal system, and
twelve years after his obligatory service and injury at Chernobyl,
Burdov v. Russia was decided in favor of the applicant, Anatoly Tik-
honovich Burdov. °2 The Court found that there had been a
violation of Article 6 Section 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of
203the Convention. The Russian Government had sought to avoid a
ruling against itself by finally paying compensation in March 2001,
coldly suggesting that Burdov could make a claim in the Russian
199. Id.
200. Interview with legal expert of the Eur. Ct. H.R. in Moscow (July 2, 2001) (cited on
condition of anonymity) (on file with author).
201. App. No. 59498/00, at *6 (Eur. Ct. H.R.June 6, 2001), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng
(holding "admissible, without prejudging the merits, the issues of non-enforcement of the
judgments (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Conven-
tion)").





courts if he felt entitled to any damages for the untimely enforce-
ment of his judgements.204 The Court held that the amount
offered-which was made only after Burdov's application was
communicated to the Russian Government by the Court-in no
way afforded adequate redress, specifically since it "did not involve
any acknowledgement of the violations alleged., 205 Therefore, Bur-
dov was still a victim of a violation of his rights under the ECHR.2 °6
The Court held that the right to a fair trial included the right to
execution of ajudgement; lack of funds was no excuse for such an
interminable delay as was suffered by the applicant. 20 7 In a sad coda
to such a historic case (and one that underlines the limitations of
the ECHR process for immediate practical relief to victims), the
Court held Burdov's claim for U.S. $300,000 in non-pecuniary
damages to be excessive; for his troubles, Burdov was finally
awarded EUR 3,000 (roughly U.S. $2,715).2°8
In November 2001, the European Court declared another case
admissible, Kalashnikov v. Russia, setting a date for hearing on the
merits for the summer of 2002.210 The facts of this complaint were
particularly gruesome, all the more so for their ubiquity in the Rus-
sian penal system:
The prisoner in question was Valerii Kalashnikov, the former
president of the Northeast Commercial Bank in Magadan (no
relation to the famous Soviet arms manufacturer). He was ar-
rested on embezzlement charges in June 1995 and spent
nearly five years waiting for his case to be heard. During that
time he lived with 23 other prisoners in a cell designed for
eight. In his complaint, Kalashnikov said that three people
shared one bed and slept in shifts, 16 prisoners sitting on the
floor, or on cardboard boxes, waiting for their turn. There was
204. Id. at *4.
205. Id. at *5.
206. Id.
207. Id. at *5 and *6.
208. Id. at *8.
209. App. No. 47095/99, at *29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.echrcoe.int/
(holding "admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's complaints concerning
(a) his conditions of detention (ECHR Article 3), (b) the length of his detention on remand
(ECHR Article 5 § 3), and (c) the length of the criminal proceedings (ECHR Article 6 § 1);
[and] declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.").
210. Sadly, this case is also an example of the extremely long process of making a com-
plaint to the European Court of Human Rights. Kalashnikov's application was lodged with
the Court on December 1, 1998. The Court did not decide to hold an oral hearing on ad-
missibility until May 15, 2001. See Press Release, Registrar, Hearing in the Case of
Kalashnikov v. Russia (Sept. 18, 2001), at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/.
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an open toilet situated next to the eating space and the cell
was full of cigarette smoke.
Kalashnikov contracted numerous fungal infections and lost
almost 30 kilograms in weight. These conditions and the inde-
terminate length of his time on remand amounted to torture,
his lawyer said. "
Over the course of his detention, Kalashnikov filed motions for
release from detention over fifteen times and conducted a hunger
strike; all his efforts at release were refused on the same grounds,
typically "the seriousness of the offence with which he was charged
and the danger of his obstructing the establishment of the truth
while at liberty."2 1 2 Refusals continued even after the investigation of
his case had been completed, making it impossible to interfere
with the "establishment of the truth., 213 In the ultimate display of
Kafka-esque bureaucratic gall, the prosecution sought and received
a further delay in Kalashnikov's trial to conduct a psychiatric
evaluation of Kalashnikov's ability to undergo trial, "in view of the
length of the applicant's detention."2 4
The Russian Government aggressively argued to have the case
declared inadmissible. Incredibly, the state asserted that the claim
was inadmissible because Kalashnikov had not exhausted the Rus-
sian domestic appeals process before making his international
215claim. Further, Russia claimed that the length of detention could
only be counted from 1998 (the date of accession to the ECHR),
not from 1995 (the date of incarceration).216 None of these claims
satisfied the Court, which declared the case nevertheless admissible
for decision on the merits.2
7
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a number
of established practices in its handling of complaints alleging viola-
tions by the Russian Federation. According to a leading British
practitioner who has been a direct participant and pioneer in the
development of the Court's case law, the Registrar of the European
Court does not consider the Russian Federation Constitutional
211. Farquharson, supra note 6. This capsule summary captures only cursorily the ex-
tent of the horror of Kalashnikov's plight. For a more complete description of Kalashnikov's
experience in pre-trial detention, see the admissibility decision, supra note 209.
212. Kalashnikov, App. No. 47095/99, at *3.
213. Id.




217. Id. at *31; see also Farquharson, supra note 6.
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Court to be an effective domestic remedy that must be exhausted
before consideration in Strasbourg.2 s This assessment is based on
the discretionary nature of the Russian Federation Constitutional
Court's judicial review of individual complaints. 2 9 Since not every
case is guaranteed a hearing before this judicial body, it is not con-
sidered an effective domestic remedy.
Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has now ruled
that the Russian process of supervisory review [nadzor] is not con-
sidered to be an effective domestic remedy for the same reason-it
is a discretionary form of judicial review. ° Parties to a dispute in
Russia (including criminal defendants) have a right to initiate su-
pervisory review or to have supervisory review initiated on their
behalf.2 2 1 Only the chairmen of higher courts and the procuracy
may lodge a protest with a second-level court for supervisory re-
view.2 Such a special appeal may result in review of a lower court's
final decision on both questions of fact and law.2 In Tumilovich v.
Russia, an admissibility decision involving an applicant who had
made six separate applications for supervisory review of a court
judgment denying her payment of back wages, the European Court
of Human Rights held that applications for supervisory review are:
[E]xtraordinary remedies, the use of which depends on the
discretionary powers of the President of the Civil Chamber of
the Supreme Court and the Deputy Prosecutor General, and
do not, therefore, constitute effective remedies within the
meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Accordingly,
these late rejections of the applicant's applications for a
218. Mole Interview, June 30, 2000, supra note 197.
219. Although an individual, interestingly, is not required to exhaust all remedies avail-
able in the "ordinary" Russian court system before filing a complaint with the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court, that court is not required to decide all cases within its
narrow jurisdiction. In addition, the Russian Federation Constitutional Court does not have
jurisdiction to review the judgments of other courts, only the "constitutionality of a law" ap-
plied or to be applied in a given case. See KONST. RF, art. 125, § 4 (1993). There is also some
dispute in the Russian legal system as to the duty of "ordinary" courts to refer a case for
review by the Russian Federation Constitutional Court.
220. See Tumilovich v. Russia, App. No. 47033/99, at *4 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 6, 1999),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (holding the application inadmissible ratione tempo-
rns); see also Pitkevich v. Russia, App. No. 47936/99, at *20 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 8, 2001),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (holding the application inadmissible on other
grounds).
221. DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 43, at 540.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 541.
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supervisory review are not relevant to the determination of
the Court's competence ratione temporis.2
4
The effect of this interpretation by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights is serious and far-reaching. If, before lodging a
complaint with the European Court, a prospective complainant
waits until a request for supervisory review has been denied (as-
suming the officials authorized to make a protest can be convinced
to do so), the complaint may be held inadmissible for having ex-
ceeded the Court's six-month time limit. However, it should be
noted that cassational appeals for review by a court of second in-
stance may be filed by the parties to a dispute regarding a
judgment that has not yet entered into legal force; this would ap-
pear to be a domestic remedy that must be exhausted before a
complaint is sent to Strasbourg.
In Kalashnikov v. Russia,22 ' the European Court for Human
Rights strengthened this principle. The Court declared that the
exhaustion of domestic remedies (required by Article 35 § 1 for
admissibility of a complaint) does not include those remedies that
are only theoretically, but not practically, available:
However, the only remedies which must be tried under Article
35 § 1 of the Convention are those that relate to the breaches
alleged and which at the same time are available and ade-
quate. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently
certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which
they lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. 226
The European Court of Human Rights further emphasized that
the burden of proof for failure to exhaust a practically available
domestic remedy is on the shoulders of the state. The Court de-
clared that such proof would require a showing that the remedy
"was accessible, was one which was capable of providing redress in
respect of the applicant's complaints and offered reasonable pros-
pects of success."
227
224. Tumilovich, App. No. 47033/99, at *4 (holding application inadmissible ratione tem-
pors).
225. Kalashnikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 18, 2001),
http://www.echr.coeint/.





There can be little doubt that accession to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms was a bold and important step forward for the advance-
ment of human rights and legal reform in the Russian Federation.
The moratorium on the continued use of the death penalty is of-
ten cited as one of the great advances garnered by Russian
accession to the European Convention. 22 Less obvious, but no less
important, is the slow seepage of European human rights norms
into Russia, a country far more porous and open to international
criteria than ever before. Particularly heartening is the citation of
international treaties and case law from the European Court of
Human Rights in the opinions of the Russian Constitutional Court.
Those words of optimism, however, should not obscure the long
road to acceptance in the international human rights community
on which only the first tentative steps have been taken in Russia.
Struggling with its Soviet legacy, the Russian Federation is only
gradually accumulating new conceptions of the role of the state,
rights of individuals, and the rule of law. Tremendous reforms are
needed in the education, compensation, and independence of the
judiciary at all levels of Russia's complex federal structure. Russian
lawyers must be educated about the tools available to them and
their clients through the ECHR.229 The new criminal procedure
228. DANILENKO & BuRNHAM, supra note 43, at 585 ("The primary reason for Russia's
backing away from the death penalty has been its wish to become a member of the Council
of Europe. Russia was finally admitted as a member in February 1996. In becoming a mem-
ber, it had to agree to an immediate moratorium on implementation of the death penalty
and its elimination within three years. The moratorium was implemented and as of this
writing, it is still in place."). The death penalty is the subject of ECHR, supra note 3, at Pro-
tocol No. 6.
229. The recent words of one leading Russian human rights lawyer raise great hope in
this regard:
I understand that the European Court of Justice will not rule that Grigorii Pasko is
not guilty [infra note 231] or that Valentin Moiseev is not guilty. This goes beyond the
framework of theirjudicial mandate. The European Court does not deal in questions
of guilt or innocence. But if, according to a decision by the European Court, a person
is recognized as a victim of an unfair trial, then you understand that a verdict calling
him a spy will become rather unconvincing. And that is what my representatives are
hoping to achieve.
Karina Moskalenko (who has filed a petition with the European Court of Human Rights
on behalf of Grigorii Pasko and former diplomat Valentin Moiseev), quoted injeremy Bran-
sten, Russia: Supreme Court Rulings Bring Hope to Pasko, Others Accused of Treason, RFE/RL
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code must be revised further to remove the need for Russia's reser-
vation to the ECHR. Expansion of the use of jury trials and formal
renunciation of the death penalty are also needed reforms.
Monumental physical reform is required of Russia's penal system,
inherited from the Soviet Union but (if it can be imagined) grown
far worse with age and disrepair.
The first Russian case has now at long last been heard on its
merits and a decision rendered against the Russian Federation. It is
the first of a tremendous flow of complaints against Russia, but by
no means the last, if Russia remains in the Council of Europe.
Celebrated cases like those of Aleksander Nikitin 230 Grigoriip , 2 3 1 . 2 3 2
Pasko, and Igor Sutyagin , as shocking as they are, obscure many
more cases of egregious violations of rights to counsel or a fair
trial. The dismissal of Judge Sergei Pashin may also be taken as an
indicator of lowjudicial independence. 3 It is far too early to make
pronouncements or predictions on the "sticking power" of the
Council of Europe initiatives and requirements for membership on
the Russian state and civil society. But the ECHR is a start, and a
step, in the right direction.
WEEKDAY MAGAZINE, Feb. 15, 2002, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/02/
15022002104851.asp.
230. Nikitin, arrested in St. Petersburg in 1996, spent ten months in pre-trial detention
awaiting trial on charges of treason and divulging state secrets for his work to reveal radioac-
tive pollution by the Russian Navy. To the surprise of many observers, the Russian Supreme
Court withstood considerable political pressure in twice rejecting the appeal of procurators,
in April and September 2000, to reopen the case. See Fred Weir, Russia's Nuclear Whistleblower
Lands Back in Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 12, 2000, at 7.
231. In a case mirroring that of Nikitin, Pasko was arrested in 1997. in Vladivostok on
charges of treason for his efforts to expose the nuclear dumping practices of Russia's Pacific
Fleet. Pasko was detained in a labor camp for almost two years. Pasko was acquitted of the
charge in 1999 but the Supreme Court ordered a new trial in November 2000. Due to the
fact that Pasko and his attorneys had yet to complete their review of the criminal investiga-
tor's case file, Pasko's trial was postponed until June 4, 2001. On July 11, 2001, Pasko's
second trial on the same offense resumed in a military court in Vladivostok. Pasko was con-
victed and sentenced to four years imprisonment. While his appeal is pending, he has been
refused release from confinement. This is true despite the fact that his appeals have been
successful. A petition on Pasko's case has been filed with the European Court of Human
Rights. SeeJulie A. Corwin, Russian Military Court Refuses to Release Pasko Pending Outcome of
Appeals Process, 6 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Feb. 5, 2002;Julie A. Corwin, Pasko Trial Delayed Again,
5 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Mar. 23, 2001; Victor Yasmann, Pasko Goes on Trial Again ... Behind
Closed Doors, 5 RFE/RL NEWSLINE,July 12, 2001;Julie A. Corwin, Pasko Case Sent Backfor Re-
tria4 4 RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Nov. 22, 2000. All of the above articles may be found at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/search/; see also Bransten, supra note 229, at * 1-3.
232. Igor Sutyagin, a researcher specializing in nonclassified military newspapers at the
highly respected Institute of Canada-USA Studies in Moscow, was arrested in October 1999
on treason charges. He has spent over fifteen months in jail awaiting trial. SeeJohn Sullivan,
The Grad Student Sent into the Cold, N.Y. TIMES (NEW JERSEY),Jan. 14, 2001, § 14, at 6; Weir,
supra note 230, at 1.
233. See Sophie Lambroschini, Judges Dismissal Underlines Problems Facing Russian Judici-




ARTICLES FIVE & SIX OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
Art. 5-Right to Liberty & Security
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of per-
son. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a proce-
dure prescribed by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after convic-
tion by a competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for
non-compliance with the lawful order of a
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of
any obligation prescribed by law;
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person ef-
fected for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence or
when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by a lawful order for
the purpose of educational supervision or his
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority;
e. the lawful detention of persons for the preven-
tion of the spreading of infectious diseases, of
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug
addicts or vagrants;
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to
prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry
into the country or of a person against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation
or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed
promptly, in a language which he understands, of
the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against
him.
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3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1.c of this article shall
be brought promptly before ajudge or other officer
authorised by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or
to release pending trial. Release may be condi-
tioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be de-
cided speedily by a court and his release ordered if
the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or de-
tention in contravention of the provisions of this
article shall have an enforceable right to compensa-
tion.
Art. 6-Right to a Fair Trial
I. In the determination of his civil rights and obliga-
tions or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public
may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
interests of morals, public order or national security
in a democratic society, where the interests ofjuve-
niles or the protection of the private life of the
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances
where publicity would prejudice the interests of jus-
tice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law.




a. to be informed promptly, in a language which
he understands and in detail, of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to
be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and exami-
nation of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if
he cannot understand or speak the language
used in court.
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APPENDIX A.2:
RESERVATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
RESERVATION APPENDED TO THE INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION
DEPOSITED ON 5 MAY 1998
In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention [Article 57
since the entry into force of the Protocol No. 11], the Russian Fed-
eration declares that the provisions of Article 5, paragraphs 3 and
4, shall not prevent the application of the following provisions of
the legislation of the Russian Federation:
-the temporary application, sanctioned by the second para-
graph of point 6 of Section Two of the 1993 Constitution of the
Russian Federation, of the procedure for the arrest, holding in cus-
tody and detention of persons suspected of having committed a
criminal offence, established by Article 11, paragraph 1, Article 89,
paragraph 1, Articles 90, 92, 96, 961, 962, 97, 101 and 122 of the
RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of 27 October 1960, with sub-
sequent amendments and additions;
-Articles 51-53 and 62 of the Disciplinary Regulations of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree No.
2140 of the President of the Russian Federation of 14 December
1993-based on Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Law of the Russian
Federation "On the Status of Servicemen" of 22 January 1993-
instituting arrest and detention in the guard-house as a disciplinary
measure imposed under extra-judicial procedure on servicemen-
private soldiers, seamen, conscripted non-commissioned officers,
non commissioned officers and officers.
The period of validity of these reservations shall be the period
required to introduce amendments to the Russian federal legisla-
tion which will completely eliminate the incompatibilities between
the said provisions and the provisions of the Convention.
[Appendices to the Reservation, consisting of extracts from the
relevant codes, decrees and legislation described above, are not
reproduced] Source: Treaty Office of the Council of Europe,
http://conventions.coe.int.
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